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COURT-ORDERED EXEMPTIONS TO SECURE RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY
Gary C. Leedes*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cases arising under the United States Constitution's religion
clauses1 fall into four general categories.2 In the first category are
establishment clause controversies involving the provision of gov-
ernment services or aid. For example, when the government seeks
to provide educational assistance to all private schools, financial
aid to parochial schools is usually challenged on establishment
clause grounds.
In the second category are controversies involving governmental
discrimination in favor of religion. These cases consist of chal-
lenges to special exemptions voluntarily provided by the govern-
ment only to religious practitioners and institutions.4 Such special
treatment might be perceived as an endorsement or improper ad-
vancement of religion.
The third category of cases involves governmental discrimination
* Professor of Law, T. C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.S.E., 1960,
University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1962, Temple Law School; LL.M., 1973, Harvard Law
School; S.J.D., 1984, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank James J. Knicely,
Esq., for his helpful comments.
1. The first amendment reads in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The
prohibition against governmental abridgment of religious liberties was extended to the
states when the Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), held that the free
exercise clause was "a fundamental concept of liberty" embodied in the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 303.
2. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 7.
3. Id.; see, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
4. For example, schools operated and supported by churches and not separately incorpo-
rated are exempt from unemployment compensation taxes under the Federal Unemploy-
ment Tax Act, I.R.C. § 3309(b)(1)(A) (1978), and complementary state statutes. St. Martin
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981). The Court often con-
strues statutes favorably to the litigant seeking a special exemption on religious grounds.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishops, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). Courts often use techniques of
statutory construction in order to avoid the necessity of deciding the free exercise of religion
issue. In some cases, exempting religious institutions avoids entanglements between govern-
ment and religion, which can become excessive and violate the establishment clause. Id. at
501-02.
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against religion. Typically these cases are characterized by govern-
mentally imposed burdens on certain religious groups, or, in some
instances, the governmental exclusion of some but not all religious
groups from benefits generally available. Such discrimination
against religious institutions and practitioners may be challenged
because of establishment clause principles and free exercise clause
guarantees. 5 The fourth category involves claims made by religious
practitioners or institutions who seek judicially imposed exemp-
tions from generally applicable laws.6 These cases present a
double-barrelled issue; the litigant's claim rests on the free exercise
clause while the government's opposition to the claim rests in part
on establishment clause principles.
This article focuses on the fourth category.7 Goldman v. Wein-
berger,s brought by a rabbi seeking an exemption from Air Force
dress code regulations, belongs to this line of precedent. Another
example is Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools," brought on
behalf of fundamentalist Christian children who sought to be ex-
cused from their public school's required course in reading instruc-
tion.10 The rabbi and the fundamentalists are caught on the horns
5. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (state university may not exclude a
student religious group from access to limited public forum that is open to comparable stu-
dent groups of a secular nature). Similarly, the establishment clause usually prevents the
government from preferring one religious group over another. Therefore, a burden imposed
by the government on some but not all religious organizations engaged in charitable solicita-
tions was held unconstitutional. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
6. See also cases brought pursuant to § 7010) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended
in 1972 and codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Section 701(0) obligates certain employers to
depart from standard operating procedures and provide employees with a reasonable accom-
modation when employees with religious beliefs request special treatment. There is a viola-
tion of the statutory mandate "unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reason-
ably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(j). In Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 107 S. Ct. 367 (1986), the court did not
expressly equate its approach in free exercise clause cases with its test to determine if em-
ployers have violated the statutory mandate of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
7. There is some overlap among the categories. For example, it has been argued that a
judicially imposed exemption that excuses a religious sect from compliance with generally
applicable law presents establishment clause issues.
8. 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
9. 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
10. Rabbi S. Simcha Goldman and Bob Mozert, a fundamentalist Christian, both have
religious convictions that are incompatible with laws that govern their activities. Both plain-
tiffs obtained injunctive relief exempting their respective religious observances from applica-
ble regulations. In Goldman, the Supreme Court held that injunctive relief was improper.
106 S. Ct. 1310, 1314. Since Mozert is presently on appeal in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the outcome of that case is uncertain. Goldman is discussed in
sections II and IV infra, and Mozert is discussed in sections II and VII infra.
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of a dilemma because their religious scruples are incompatible with
state or federal law. Without helpful judicial intervention, they
must choose to suffer either legal sanctions or the condemnations
of conscience.11 The individual's choice between two unsatisfactory
alternatives 12 places him under severe stress.
Courts are sympathetic to persons faced with this Hobson's
Choice. Even Justice Stanley Reed, not the staunchest defender of
religious freedom, once admitted that there are "personal liberties
which are beyond the power of government to impair.' 3 Justice
Reed recognized that some of these liberties belong to the spiritual
realm. 4 Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy added that "our
democratic form of government. . . has a high responsiblity to ac-
commodate itself to the religious views of minorities, however un-
11. The threshold question in the typical free exercise case is whether the dictates of an
individual's conscience are sincerely rooted in religion. See United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78 (1944) (the trier of fact was forbidden to determine whether an individual's religious
beliefs were true). The Supreme Court, however, has never clearly distinguished religious
beliefs from other conscientious beliefs. In many cases, however, courts have adopted the
Supreme Court's psychological approach, utilized in Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929 (4th
Cir. 1986). Dettmer is a member of the Church of Wicca-a cult that is based partly on the
belief in witchcraft and occult rituals. Excerpts from Judge Butzner's opinion follow:
In determining whether the Church of Wicca is a religion protected by the free exer-
cise clause of the first amendment, the district court properly considered whether the
Church occupies a place in the lives of its members "parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God" in religions more widely accepted in the United States.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1964). The district court found that mem-
bers of the Church of Wicca "adhere to a fairly complex set of doctrines relating to
the spiritual aspect of their lives." These doctrines concern ultimate questions of
human life, as do the doctrines of recognized religions. See Africa v. Pennsylvania,
662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1982); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 440 (2d Cir. 1981); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208 (3d
Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
Id. at 931.
In free exercise cases since Ballard, the trier of fact is forbidden to determine whether an
individual's religious beliefs are true. Individuals may believe what they cannot prove.
Moreover, "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection." Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 714
(1981). A person may survive the Court's threshold test even if he is struggling with his
beliefs and is unable to articulate them "with the clarity and precision that a more sophisti-
cated person might employ." Id. at 715; see also Alston, Religion, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 140 (P. Edwards ed. 1967). See generally Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in
Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753 (1984).
12. The fear of supernatural sanctions and the loss of moral self-respect that ensues when
an individual obeys a law that violates his religious scruples are generally severe. Further,
disobedience of the law carries with it the loss of entitlements, and often the threat of crimi-
nal sanctions.
13. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 593 (1942), vacated and state courts' judgments rev'd,
319 U.S. 103 (1943).
14. Id.
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popular and unorthodox those views may be.' ' 5
Justice Reed's rhetoric was impressive, but his opinion for the
Supreme Court went on to uphold the constitutionality of an ordi-
nance that required an evangelist to pay a fee and obtain a license
before he engaged in religious activity. Jones v. Opelika16 illus-
trates that rhetoric alone cannot secure the free exercise of
religion."
Precious though it is, religious freedom is not an absolute right"8
to be exercised without regard for other important interests pro-
tected by the Constitution.'9 It is impossible for judges to immu-
nize religious activity from all governmental regulations that pro-
tect the health, safety, morals, and the general welfare. Individuals
lack the right to engage in religious activities that seriously inter-
fere with the legally protected rights of others. For example, as the
Supreme Court noted in Prince v. Massachusetts,0 "[t]he right to
practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the com-
munity . . . to communicable disease."' 2' Courts have also upheld
laws that prevent devout individuals from doing harm to
themselves.22
"Exercise of this 'police power' has frequently created conflict
between governmental authority and avowed religious rights of in-
dividuals and groups. '23 In such situations, courts try to reconcile
15. Id. at 624 (Black, Douglas, Murphy, JJ., dissenting).
16. 316 U.S. 584.
17. Subsequently, the Court reversed itself, and vacated its judgment and the judgment
of the state court in favor of the government. Jones, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
18. The free exercise of religion would be an absolute right if the Court immunized reli-
gious activity, regardless of context, from any governmental restrictions. Freedom of reli-
gion, however, is not absolutely sheltered.
19. Freedom of religion has a double aspect which includes the freedom to believe and the
freedom to act. In theory, "[t]he Free Exercise Clause categorically prohibits government
from regulating, prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs as such." McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (plurality opinion). Thus, the freedom to hold religious convictions is
an absolute right but freedom to act is not. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04. In practice, how-
ever, "a sharp distinction cannot be made between religious belief and religiously motivated
action." McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 631 n.2. (Brennan, J., concurring). "[T]here can be no doubt
that this freedom to act is not absolute but qualified, being subject to regulation in the
public interest which does not unduly infringe the right." Opelika, 316 U.S. at 618 (Murphy,
J., dissenting).
20. 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
21. Id. at 166-67.
22. Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880, cert. denied, 264 Ala. 697, 88 So. 2d 887
(1956); see State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975) (prohibitions against
snake handling sustained).
23. R. MILLER & R. FLOWERs, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE AND THE
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the competing interests of the individual and the government. Fre-
quently, governmental interests are deemed more compelling than
a particular litigant's interest in religious freedom. The Supreme
Court, however, does not condone burdensome government regula-
tion of religious activities merely because rules are rules, or be-
cause the challenged regulation is rational and nondiscriminatory.
"The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding freedom of
. ..religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe them out."24
Justice Douglas noted that "[f]reedom of press, freedom of speech,
freedom of religion are in a preferred position. '25 When the gov-
ernment unnecessarily imposes severe burdens on preferred rights,
in most instances the burdensome law is presumptively
unconstitutional.26
In some cases, the presumption of unconstitutionality is easily
rebutted-even though the challenged law curtails the religious
freedom of an individual seeking a personal exemption.2 7 More-
over, courts do not consistently place the entire burden of persua-
sion on the government when litigants request the courts to compel
the government to carve out a religious exemption from a burden-
some law.2" In free exercise cases, the Supreme Court obviously
does not follow an inflexible, highly formalistic approach.
The hornbook generalization that the free exercise clause re-
quires "the government [to] make some accommodation for the
practice of religious beliefs when it pursues ends which incidentally
burden religious practices ' 29 is the product of an ad hoc balancing
test.30 There are many problems associated with ad hoc balancing
which, by its very nature, produces some case rulings that favor
the government because of demonstrable administrative necessi-
ties. In some cases, the Supreme Court itself has shown a prefer-
SUPREME COURT 57 (1982).
24. Opelika, 316 U.S. at 608 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
25. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
26. Id. ("[E]quality in treatment does not save the [governmental regulation] .. .
27. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Since imposition of social security
taxes was not unconstitutional, the Court said that the state may justify a limitation on
religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplishing an overriding governmental
objective.).
28. Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983) (denial of parent's claim that
his religious beliefs were infringed by North Carolina's compulsory school attendance law),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984).
29. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1067 (3d ed. 1986).
30. Section III infra describes the standards utilized in ad hoc balancing and indentifies
the factors to be balanced.
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ence for a moral principle weightier than demands for religious
freedom.3 1
Many Justices are understandably concerned about the increas-
ing number of claims for exemptions. Given the numerous in-
stances of conflict between faith and government, "the Free Exer-
cise Clause would become a serious infringement on the
government's ability to perform its functions if the Clause did not
take into account the government's legitimate interests in denying
religious exemptions and exceptions. '3 2
Courts are vulnerable to criticism from libertarians when they
find, in the absence of substantial evidence, that a religiously
based exemption causes the government undue hardship. For ex-
ample, in Goldman, the government successfully convinced the Su-
preme Court to speculate about problems of military discipline
that would arise if a rabbi wore a yarmulke (skull cap).3 3 Indeed, it
appears "there is a growing discomfort on the part of the Court
with the Free Exercise Clause doctrine-that has now flowered, al-
beit in a limited number of cases-that permits people to get ex-
emptions [that no one else is entitled to] because of their religious
beliefs. '3 4
II. A RECENT CAUSE CELEBRE
The modern Supreme Court's "free exercise" guarantee, as
Rabbi Goldman learned, is in the nature of a limited warranty with
many disclaimers. The Court held that he must face the ignominy
of an Air Force court martial if he continued to wear his yar-
mulke.3 5 Thus far, Bob Mozert, a fundamentalist Christian, has
been more successful in court than the rabbi.
In Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools,36 seven funda-
mentalist families argued that they have a religious duty to protect
their children from the state when public school authorities engage
in a program of instructional reading that systematically contra-
31. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (claims of religious freedom
subordinated by constitutionalized moral principle that desegregation in education is an
imperative).
32. McConnell, supra note 2, at 30.
33. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1313.
34. Choper, The Free Exercise of Religion, 1981-82 THE SUPREME COURTI. TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS 61 (1983).
35. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
36. 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
340 [Vol. 21:335
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dicts the Bible. Litigation became necessary because public school
regulations required children to leave school when they refused to
read from required secular books that violated their religious faith.
The district court issued an injunction that permitted the funda-
mentalists to withdraw their children from the required course in
instructional reading. The children are still entitled to take all the
other courses offered in the public schools.3 7
As the Los Angeles Times described the decision:
A federal judge ruled ... that a rural eastern Tennessee school dis-
trict violated the constitutional rights of seven fundamentalist
Christian families by forcing their children to read textbooks with
selections from works offensive to their religious beliefs-among
them, Shakespeare's "Macbeth," "The Diary of Anne Frank" and
Hans Christian Andersen's fairy tales.38
Mozert troubles Anthony Podesta, president of People for the
American Way,3 9 who claims that the decision is a "recipe for dis-
aster for the public schools. '40 He predicts that "[tihe schoolhouse
door will have to be converted into a revolving door as different
sects [either opt out of public education completely or] participate
in the public school curriculum in differing degrees." '41 Many
school officials and professional educators agree with Podesta.
Even, William Bennett, the conservative Secretary of Education,
disapproves of the district court's ruling.42
James J. Kilpatrick predicts dire consequences will ensue if
Mozert is affirmed. "If [the district court's] decision survives ap-
peal to the 6th U.S. Circuit and ultimately to the U.S. Supreme
Court, we can look for something approaching chaos in both ele-
mentary and secondary education. School boards would find it just
about impossible to accommodate the complaints and demands of
different religious and anti-religious groups. ' 4 Kilpatrick adds:
37. Id. at 1203.
38. L.A. Times, Oct. 25, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
39. Podesta's organization is paying for some of the legal services provided to the authori-
ties who oppose the fundmentalist's challenge to Hawkins County's instructional reading
course.
40. L.A. Times, Oct. 25, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
41. Id.
42. Richmond News Leader, Oct. 31, 1986, at B2, col. 2.
43. Richmond News Leader, Nov. 3, 1986, at 17, col. 4. To further stoke the raging furor,
in December 1986, the district court awarded the seven fundamentalist families that were
plaintiffs in Mozert a judgment in the amount of $51,531.00 to reimburse the families for
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[N]o one really gains in this situation. It is patently absurd to expel
The Wizard of Oz from a child's reading list because the Oz book
deals with a witch. Farewell Cinderella! Goodbye to the Diary of
Anne Frank. Let us close the windows lest a fresh idea blow in. A
greater disservice to children scarcely could be imagined.""
Journalists and press reports singled out just a few books to make
the fundamentalists' objections appear bizarre. The parents actu-
ally submitted a list of 300 objections to the readings mandated by
Hawkins County authorities. Surely Kilpatrick is not arguing that
impressionable children are not affected by the materials they
read. But is he arguing that the local board of education knows
better than a parent whether a particular child's spiritual growth
will be adversely affected by viewpoints which are, in the parents'
views, false and damning? For unreceptive students and parents,
the ideological discipline of fresh ideas in the name of pluralism is
no less coercive than other ideological disciplines. Nevertheless,
there are many professional educators who reject, as outmoded and
narrow-minded, parental objections to any approved school texts,
notwithstanding their profound theological implications.
The district court opinion in Mozert points out that the parents
were not seeking to have any textbooks "banned from the class-
room." 45 Instead, the "plaintiffs simply claim[ed] that they should
not be forced to choose between reading books that offend their
religious beliefs and foregoing a free public education."4 6 It re-
mains for the appellate courts to examine the trial record and the
rationale offered in support of the district court's injunction. 7
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S BALANCING TEST
Many devout individuals fear that their very salvation (or integ-
rity as a moral actor) is at stake if they obey the law rather than
private school tuition and other expenses incurred as a result of the children's repeated
suspensions from public school. Brief for Hawkins County Public Schools at 26, Mozert v.
Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 582 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Tenn. 1984), rev'd and remanded,
765 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1985), reh'g, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) [hereinafter Appel-
lant's brief].
44. Richmond News Leader, Nov. 3, 1986, at 17, col. 4.
45. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1195.
46. Id.
47. In Section VII, I argue that the school authorities failed to introduce substantial evi-
dence demonstrating that the relief requested by the fundamentalists entailed undue
hardship.
[Vol. 21:335
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their conscience.48 As a result, they lose important government
benefits such as unemployment insurance, 9 food stamps,5" and tax
exemptions.5 1 Obedience to the Holy Spirit led Mr. Mozert to
withdraw his child from the public school's compulsory reading
program, even though he knew that his child would be expelled
from public school. Similarly, the will to obey God required Rabbi
Goldman to wear a skull cap, even though he was threatened with
a court martial. The Supreme Court's balancing test is appropri-
ately applied when an individual's compliance with generally ap-
plicable laws makes his free exercise of religion very costly. But
which religious convictions count when courts balance competing
interests, and how much weight should be ascribed to the interests
that count? Uncertainties abound, and commentators are "troub-
led by the absence of any understandable. . . principle that would
rein in the discretion of the Justices themselves. '52
The believer's interest in avoiding the sanction that will be im-
posed when he disobeys the law is one element that must be
weighed. The sanction might be the loss of an important benefit
provided by the government, a jail sentence, or a fine. The harsher
the sanction, the greater the intensity of the oppression. Thus, ex-
pulsion from school is a greater burden than a one-day suspension.
Depriving a person of food stamps, or the very means of subsis-
tence is a greater oppression than a ten dollar fine.
There is also a psychological component to the interest to be
weighed on the individual's side of the scales. The psychological
hardships imposed by generally applicable laws carrying penal
sanctions are normally quite severe, but the degree of the pain var-
ies with each individual.5 3 Thus, each claim for an exemption has
to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.5 4 This kind of piecemeal
48. Judge Augustus Hand referred to "an inward mentor, call it conscience or God, that is
for many persons. . . the equivalent of what has always been thought a religious impulse."
United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943) (involving construction of the
conscientious objector exemption of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940).
49. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding state's denial of unem-
ployment compensation benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who quit work for religious reasons
violated his first amendment right to free exercise of religion).
50. Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
51. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
52. See, e.g., Tribe, First Amendment Trends: Ad Hoc Doctrines Do Not A Constitution
Make, 1981-82 THE SUPREME COURTI. TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 209, 211 (1983).
53. See Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REV. 327, 337 (1969).
54. Some courts might choose to place more weight on the individual's side of the scales
when his religious belief is central, rather than peripheral, to his faith.
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lawmaking is inevitable when case rulings depend on loosely struc-
tured standards designed to balance competing interests.5
The elements of the Supreme Court's present balancing test
have been described as follows:
In each case the claimant must first make some demonstration that
the regulation which proscribes or prescribes certain activities sub-
stantially burdens the practice of the claimant's religion. Second, if
such a burden exists, the Court will weigh the governmental interest
in the regulation against the burden on free exercise rights. Even
though the governmental interest appears to be of a sufficient mag-
nitude to justify some burden on religious activity, it will be held
invalid unless it burdens religious freedom no more than necessary
to promote the overriding secular interest.56
The word "necessary," emphasized above, refers to the Court's
scrutiny of alternative modes of regulation that might be less bur-
densome for persons seeking exemptions.5 7 "The state may justify
an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restric-
tive means of achieving some compelling state interest. ' 58 There is
always a latent ambiguity when the Court refers to least restrictive
and less restrictive alternatives."' Weakly construed, this test re-
quires only an argument "that there . . . [is] no less restrictive al-
ternative capable of serving the state's interest as efficiently as it
is served by the regulation under attack."60 This weak formulation
gives the governmental interest in efficiency too much weight.
A more protective approach-when a law provides important so-
cietal benefits-is to inquire whether the incremental benefit of
enforcing the law against those who object, on religious grounds,
outweighs the incremental loss of religious freedom. For example,
one question in Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools"' is
55. When the Supreme Court endeavors to achieve fairness in each individual case, prin-
cipled decision making suffers as a result.
56. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1079 (3rd ed. 1986) (emphasis
added).
57. Under the compelling interest test, "the government must establish both a very pow-
erful interest and the absence of any 'less restrictive alternative' to achieve that interest."
Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 762.
58. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
59. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482 (1975).
60. Id. at 1484-85.
61. 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
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whether any incremental societal benefit produced by not allowing
the parents to withdraw their children from one required course in
reading justifies the children's suspension from other courses. Not
all courts, however, balance at the margins, and ask whether the
marginally greater effectiveness of a uniform policy-when com-
pared to the alternative of granting religiously based exemp-
tions-justifies an incremental burden on religious freedom.
The Supreme Court does not require the government to offer an
exemption which is the least restrictive alternative imaginable.
The exemption requested by a litigant might be, under the circum-
stances, an impractical alternative-even though it is the least re-
strictive interference with religious liberty. The Court's less restric-
tive alternative test, however, is not merely a utilitarian, cost-
benefit analysis. If the courts were concerned solely with what
"economists call a Pareto-superior transaction, '62 judges would be
inadequately sensitive to the considerations of fairness which are
critical in many cases involving a litigant's ultimate concerns. For
example, courts rarely subordinate religious liberty to the govern-
ment's interest in avoiding a little administrative inconvenience.
However, "there is a point at which accommodation would 'radi-
cally restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.' ",63
When the Court "inquire[s] whether accommodating the exer-
cise of religion will unduly interfere with fulfillment of governmen-
tal objectives,16 4 the importance of the government's highly gener-
alized interests (in public health and safety, public peace and
order, education, defense and revenue) is often immaterial. "To
measure an individual interest directly against one of these rarified
values inevitably makes the individual interest appear the less sig-
nificant." 5 In order to avoid this pitfall, courts must consider the
more particularized societal interests that arguably justify the gov-
ernment's refusal to grant exemptions to conscientious objectors.
In other words, the relevant government interest is usually not the
62. Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1431, 1431 (1986). A Pareto-superior transaction is a fundamental tenet of
classical liberalism which holds that the government generally should not interfere with vol-
untary transactions (e.g., withdrawing a child from school) that impose no uncompensated
costs on others.
63. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 606 (1961)).
64. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1126 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom by equally
divided Court, Jensen v. Quaring, 471 U.S. 1091 (1985).
65. Clark, supra note 53, at 331.
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diffuse societal harm that will occur if the statute were not en-
forced at all.
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Quar-
ing v. Peterson,6 avoided the error of confusing the state's unim-
portant particular interest in denying a religious exemption with
its important general secular interest in maintaining the underly-
ing system of regulation. 7 Frances J. Quaring had sought a Ne-
braska driver's license, but she refused to have her photograph
taken and affixed to the license as required by Nebraska law. Be-
cause of her refusal, she was not permitted to drive a motor vehi-
cle. The court was convinced that her refusal was based on sin-
cerely held religious beliefs.68 Therefore, the court proceeded to
balance Nebraska's interest against the burdens on her religious
freedom. But Nebraska's attorneys articulated many interests, in-
cluding the state's interest in highway safety. Since this general
interest is not necessarily frustrated by a limited number of ex-
emptions, the court stated, "To prevail, the Nebraska officials
must demonstrate that their refusal to exempt Quaring from the
photograph requirement serves a [particularized] compelling state
interest."69 The Eighth Circuit's decision in favor of Quaring was
affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court.70
The division of the Supreme Court illustrates the difficulty in
predicting how the Court will rule in free exercise cases when the
question is whether the governmental objective is a compelling in-
terest. Much of the unpredictability is caused by the difficulty in
articulating the government's interest with appropriate precision.
For example, the dissenting circuit judge in Quaring balanced Ne-
braska's "legitimate interest in assuring instantaneous identifica-
tion for all of its regular license holders."'1 This is a tautological
state interest, and one that usually is insufficiently compelling.
Similarly, the interest in uniform treatment for the sake of uni-
formity leads to circular reasoning. The government's asserted
need to identify all motorists quickly and accurately in order to
66. 728 F.2d 1121.
67. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 855 (1978) (crucial issue in free exercise
cases is state's interest in denying exemption, not in maintaining underlying rule or
program).
68. Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1125.
69. Id. at 1126.
70. Jensen, 471 U.S. 1091.
71. Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1128 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
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ensure that only licensed motorists drive on the roads, 2 and the
interest in "avoiding the administratively cumbersome task of con-
sidering applications for religious exemptions"73 were somewhat
more particularized. Nevertheless, as noted, the panel decided that
"none of the interests [advanced by] the Nebraska officials [were]
sufficient[ly compelling] to justify the burden upon Quaring's reli-
gious liberty [caused by the failure to exempt her from the photo-
graph requirement].'
The opinion of the Eighth Circuit in Quaring demonstrates, as
noted above, that the issues should be narrowed down to an evalu-
ation of competing interests. The government's interest must
amount to more than just the diffuse societal interests that led to
the enactment of the challenged statute (e.g., traffic safety). This is
not to say that the general governmental interest is never relevant.
It often is. For example, the general interest in traffic safety is rele-
vant if the individual's religious convictions require him to drive
seventy-five miles per hour. However, the connection between the
general interest in traffic safety and Nebraska's photograph re-
quirement was too tenuous to justify a policy that does not permit
selective exemptions based on religious grounds.
In many cases, the government argues that it lacks the resources
or ability to determine whether an individual's request for an ex-
emption is based on sincerely held religious convictions. This par-
ticularized interest in administrative convenience has more weight
when numerous claims for exemptions are anticipated, especially if
it is difficult to separate legitimate from spurious claims. On occa-
sion, the claims for exemptions will create a judicial overload. For
example, when draft boards are flooded with claims for exemptions
for persons who object to a particular war, it is extremely difficult
to distinguish religious from political and philosophical objections.
Moreover, selective exemptions arguably cause resentment that
has a deleterious effect on morale. 5 In one controversial case, the
Supreme Court decided that there would be less unfairness gener-
ated if no selective exemptions were granted. 6 More than one
commentator, however, thinks that a more concrete showing of a
threat to morale should have been required by the courts in cases
72. Id. at 1126.
73. Id. at 1127.
74. Id.
75. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971).
76. Id.
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brought by conscientious objectors who objected to unjust wars,
but not all wars. 7 The Court apparently was unwilling to take
risks because of the magnitude of the interests involved in the war
effort, and because of the risk that its own resources would be
stretched beyond prudent limits if it reviewed every draft board
decision.
In United States v. Lee,78 the government failed to introduce
concrete evidence showing an actual threat to its social security
program. The Court, however, was concerned with possible harm,
rather than any demonstrable clear and present danger. The
Amish have a religious obligation to provide their older members
with the kind of assistance contemplated by the social security sys-
tem, 9 and Lee argued that his "Amish religion not only prohibits
the acceptance of social security benefits, but also bars all contri-
butions by Amish to the social security system."80 His challenge to
the government's policy of denying exemptions to Amish employ-
ers was weak because the Court did not want to impose the em-
ployer's religious beliefs on the employees."' Moreover, Lee was en-
gaged in commercial activities,82 and the distinction between
commercial and religious activity is often "vital."' 3
The government successfully convinced the Court of "the risk
that a myriad of other claims would be too difficult to process. "84
The Court was also convinced that the soundness of the social se-
curity system would be undermined if many persons seeking ex-
emptions from the mandatory system of contributions could opt
out of the program.8 5 The evidence that supported the govern-
ment's apprehension was barely substantial. Nevertheless, the
Court concluded that "Congress has accommodated, to the extent
compatible with a comprehensive national program, the practices
of those who believe it a violation of their faith to participate in
the social security system."'8 Lee was held subject to the tax to the
77. E.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 67, at 856.
78. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
79. L. PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE AND THE BURGER COURT 13-14 (1984).
80. Lee, 455 U.S. at 255.
81. Id. at 261.
82. Administrative screening difficulties increase when it is hard to discern whether the
persons seeking exemptions are motivated by economic self-interest or religious belief.
83. Cf. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110 (1943).
84. Lee, 455 U.S. at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 258-61.
86. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260. Congress had in fact already provided an exemption for Amish
who are self-employed, I.R.C. § 1402(g), but not for employers. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260-61.
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same extent as other employers.
The Supreme Court, of course, cannot specify in advance, with-
out being arbitrary, how many claims for exemptions the national
interest can tolerate.8 7 The Court was perhaps rightly concerned
with evidence disclosing that the fiscal soundness of the social se-
curity system has been questioned by several studies. Obviously, if
the Amish are exempt from paying all social security taxes, the
likelihood of many other claims for exemptions is high. The Court,
in Lee, went on to hold that "the broad public interest in main-
taining a sound tax system is of such a high order. . . [that] reli-
gious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis
for resisting the tax.""8
Concerning administrative difficulties, courts respect legislative
judgments that a system for processing claims for exemptions
would create insurmountable problems.8 9 Judicial deference to the
legislature, however, is not warranted, regardless of the govern-
ment's representations, if the legislative record and the trial record
both lack probative evidence substantiating the government's rep-
resentations concerning a parade of horribles that will ensue if any
exemptions are granted. If judicial deference becomes routine, leg-
islative speculation about administrative nightmares will suffice in-
stead of substantial evidence.
Lee illustrates that balancing tests are notoriously unreliable,
but they are obviously much more protective than approaches that
defer to the rational judgments of legislatures and officials.
Goldman v. Weinberger0 illustrates what happens when the Su-
preme Court does not exercise independent judgment, and defers
to the balance struck by the bureaucracy.91 Lower courts have also
eschewed balancing when prisoners incarcerated in a penitentiary
request certain exemptions from prison regulations.92 Because
87. Clark, supra note 53, at 334. The difficulties of distinguishing between legitimate and
spurious claims for religious exemptions, in some situations, imposes a severe hardship on
the governments.
88. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260.
89. The record in Lee, however, indicated that, in addition to the Amish, only one other
organization sought an exemption from the challenged social security tax. Id. at 257 n.6.
90. 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
91. See infra notes 96-179 and accompanying text.
92. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit accorded "wide-ranging
deference 'to prison administrators' decisions concerning the proper means to accommodate
prisoners' rights to the needs of 'internal order and discipline,' [in the absence of] substan-
tial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to
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Goldman may be the harbinger of a trend that will curtail the
scope of the Court's seminal holdings in Sherbert v. Verner,93 Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 4 and Thomas v. Review Board,9 the next section
will deal with Goldman.96
IV. GOLDMAN V. WEINBERGER
Rabbi Goldman was ordered to cease wearing his yarmulke 7
notwithstanding his sincerely held religious objections.9 After re-
fusing to comply with the order, Goldman was threatened with dis-
ciplinary action. "The district court . . . permanently enjoined
the Air Force from prohibiting Goldman to wear a yarmulke while
in uniform and from punishing him for refusing to remove it."'100
The Air Force appealed, contending that its dress code fostered
teamwork, discipline and espirit de corps. There was not much
concrete evidence as to how the headgear regulation, as applied to
Goldman, furthered these military objectives. 1 1 The Air Force
cited its own experience, and introduced a report that showed
"that laxity in enforcing such [dress code] regulations had contrib-
uted to lapses in discipline in other branches of the armed ser-
vices."' 1 2 Moreover, the Air Force had filed an affidavit of a Major
General which "implies that permitting Plaintiff to wear his yar-
mulke will crush the spirit of uniformity, which in turn will weaken
the will and fighting ability of the Air Force."' 103 In response,
these considerations.'" Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 934 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979)). The Fourth Circuit did not carefully attempt to
balance competing interests; instead, it merely deferred to prison authorities.
For a discussion of cases involving prison inmates who claim they are entitled to religious
privileges not available to other prisoners, see L. PFEFFER, supra note 79, at 159-63.
93. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
94. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
95. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
96. The Court's seminal cases will be analyzed in section V infra.
97. Air Force regulation prohibits, with few exceptions, the wearing of headgear indoors.
A.F.R. 35-10 (1980).
98. Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S.
Ct. 1310 (1986).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1535. The district court's holding was consistent with Chief Justice Warren's
ex cathedra statement that "our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights
simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes." Warren, The Bill of Rights and the
Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 188 (1962).
101. Goldman, 734 F.2d at 1538.
102. Id.
103. Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 530 F. Supp. 12, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1981), vacated, 734
F.2d 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
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Goldman argued "first that these assertions . . . have not been
tested or validated, and second that in any case it is evident that
making an exception for him would have no deleterious effect, as
shown by the outstanding performance record he compiled during
the three and one-half years when his practice of wearing a yar-
mulke went unchallenged.' 14 Although Goldman's response indi-
cated that the government's evidence was thin, the government in-
sisted that "military judgments are entitled to special
deference.' '1 05
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
attempted to distinguish between the government's arguments
"concerning the general validity of uniform requirements,"' 0 6 and
the more particularized interests of the Air Force concerning "the
feasibility of making exceptions to the regulation.' 10 7 The court
upheld the general validity of the regulations because it deferred
to the military judgment that "strict compliance with uniform reg-
ulations breaks down the barrier of resentment to discipline, possi-
bly more than anything else."'' 0
The court of appeals had more difficulty justifying the Air
Force's refusal to make a special exemption for the rabbi'09 who
had an outstanding performance record. It rejected, as implausible,
the argument that unauthorized headgear adversely affects the
safety of personnel." 0 Goldman worked in a mental health clinic of
an Air Force hospital, and no safety hazards caused by his wearing
of a yarmulke could be imagined. The court stated, "We have no
doubt that more narrowly drawn regulations, accommodating reli-
gious practices to a greater degree, would satisfy such safety
concerns.
' ' 1
The Air Force also asserted an interest in having every service
member maintain a professional appearance." 2 The dress code in
104. Goldman, 734 F.2d at 1538.
105. Id. at 1535.
106. Id. at 1538.
107. Id. at 1539.
108. Id. at 1538-39 (quoting H. SEMMES, PORTRAIT OF PATTON 8 (1955)).
109. The government did not press the claim that the Air Force lacked the administrative
resources available to process claims for religiously based exemptions.
110. An Air Force General, who was a government witness during the trial, had testified
that "an unauthorized hat worn on a flight line might fly into a jet engine and cause it to
explode or malfunction." Goldman, 734 F.2d at 1539.
111. Id.
112. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1320 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Obvi-
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force when Goldman was ordered to remove his yarmulke states:
Neither the Air Force nor the public expects absolute uniformity of
appearance. Each member has the right, within limits, to express
individuality through his or her appearance. However, the image of
a disciplined service member who can be relied on to do his or her
job excludes the extreme, the unusual, and the fad." 3 AFR 35-10,Par. 1-12.a(2) (1978). 114
Goldman's service record, during the period in which he wore the
yarmulke, disclosed that he had received high marks for his atti-
tude, dress, and appearance. 115 The district court did not find that
Goldman presented an image that was unprofessional; in fact, the
district court found that his yarmulke was unobtrusive." 6 In view
of the trial record, Goldman contended on appeal that an exemp-
tion for him would not cause "disruptive aberrations from the uni-
form requirements. 1" 7
The Air Force's need for "exceptionless uniformity" 18 was sup-
ported only by "a study of religious garb requirements, indicating
that various sects require a wide variety of practices, including
wearing turbans, robes, . . . jodphurs and symbolic daggers."" 19
Supposedly, "the cumulative effect of [the] numerous excep-
tions" 20 that might be requested "would disrupt . . . efforts to
maintain discipline, morale and teamwork."'' The Air Force in-
sisted "that it cannot reasonably distinguish among various reli-
gious practices, but must either allow or disallow all requested ex-
emptions.' ' 22 This argument was weak because "it appears that
the Air Force already distinguishes among practices that may be
religious.' 23 Thus, the Air Force allows Mormons to wear "temple
ously, an individual who by his dress or grooming conveys a message of defiance of authority
or impertinence is unable to maintain an appropriate professional appearance.
113. It is not a fad when an Orthodox Jewish rabbi wears a yarmulke.
114. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1326 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
115. Goldman, 734 F.2d at 1533.
116. Id. at 1539.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1538.
119. Id. at 1539.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1538. Rabbi Goldman countered by arguing that the record lacked evidence
indicating the number of claims that might be filed "making it impossible to reach any
conclusion about likely disruption." Id. at 1539.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1540.
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garments" underneath their outer clothing. 124 Moreover, the Army
had granted an exception to uniform regulations for Sikhs, al-
lowing them to wear the beard and turban. 125
The court of appeals finally concluded that the Air Force actu-
ally uses the criterion of visibility to distinguish between permissi-
ble and unauthorized, obtrusive deviations from its dress code.
Since the yarmulke is visible, it is an impermissible aberration.
The court of appeals conceded that the criterion of visibility is an
"arbitrary cut off point.' 26 Nevertheless the court was impressed
by the Air Force's need to avoid the resentment that would be felt
by individuals, religious and nonreligious, who are denied special
permission to deviate from the prescribed dress code. 27
The court of appeals sought to determine "whether legitimate
mililtary ends are sought to be achieved by means designed to ac-
commodate the individual right to an appropriate degree."' 2 The
court decided that the regulation could not be more narrowly
drawn without causing perceptions of unfairness that would create
resentment and adversely affect morale. 29 Therefore, less restric-
tive alternatives were not feasible. In sum, the court of appeals
sided with the Air Force, holding that "the peculiar nature of the
Air Force's interest in uniformity renders the strict enforcement of
its [arbitrary] regulation permissible. 13 0
The court of appeals' level of scrutiny was hardly strict, but it
did not indicate that its test will always be satisfiable. There was
precedent for heightened judicial scrutiny of military law' 3 ' that
restricts the free exercise of religion, 3 2 but none of the cases are on
124. Id.
125. "This exception [was] limited to Sikhs who are inducted; those who voluntarily en-
list must comply with the regulations in the same manner as other military personnel. A.R.
600-20." C. SHANOR & T. TERRELL, MILITARY LAW 42 (1980).
126. Goldman, 734 F.2d at 1540.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1536.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1540.
131. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 79, at 150-51, 154-59 and cases cited therein.
132. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), the Supreme Court gave great def-
erence to the governmental interests in defense and the power to raise armies, and there was
not any real weighing of the individual interests. The Court, however, noted that the peti-
tioners had made "no attempt to provide a careful definition of the claim exemption that
they ask the courts to carve out and protect." Id. at 456. The Court at least gave lip service
to a balancing test stating that the purposes behind Congress' unwillingness to exempt se-
lective conscientious objectors is "of a kind and weight sufficient to justify under the Free
Exercise Clause the impact of the conscription laws on those who object to particular wars."
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all fours with Goldman.' For example, in Anderson v. Laird, 34
students at the federal military academies challenged mandatory
chapel requirements. Thomas Moorer, (later Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff) testified that students were not required to wor-
ship, but were required to observe servicemen in prayer in order to
gain awareness and respect for the force religion has on the lives of
men.13 5 This awareness would help them give guidance to those
who turn to religion during combat crises. 36 The testimony pro-
vided a rational basis for the military to find that chapel attend-
ance furthered secular goals by making the cadets and midshipmen
more effective officers. For the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, Chief Judge Bazelon stated that "no finding of a secular
purpose or effect could justify this form of governmental imposi-
tion of religion."'31 7 The court of appeals noted that "while an indi-
vidual's freedoms may of necessity be abridged upon his entrance
into military life, there is no authority for the point that his right
to freedom of religion is abolished."""s
Anderson involved a requirement that, on its face, restricted re-
ligious liberty. On the other hand, the regulation challenged in
Goldman was religiously neutral on its face. Nevertheless, the
technical question before the Supreme Court was whether it would
defer to the judgment of the military. The Court deferred, indicat-
ing that "[t]he essence of military service 'is the subordination of
the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the ser-
vice.' ,"9 The Court affirmed the court of appeals. As a result of
the Court's judgment, the rabbi has a "Hobson's Choice": either he
fails to fulfill a religious duty,140 or he faces the possibility of an
Id. at 461. The Court in Gillette also proceeded under the assumption that the balancing
test articulated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), was fully applicable. Gillette, 401
U.S. at 462. The Court also was influenced by Mr. Clark, who recognized that there is a
rebuttable presumption that entitles an individual holding sincere religious beliefs to an
exemption. Clark, supra note 53, at 345; see also id. at 365. The Court in Goldman, unlike
the Court in Gillette, went out of its way to indicate that the balancing test adopted in
Sherbert was inapplicable in the military context. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1312-13.
133. 106 S. Ct. 1310.
134. 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972), reh'g 316 F. Supp. 1081 (D. C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
135. L. PFEFFER, supra note 79, at 143.
136. Id.
137. Anderson, 466 F.2d at 292.
138. Id. at 294.
139. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1313 (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92 (1953)).
140. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1317 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 21:335
RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES
imminent court-martial. 141
The Supreme Court paid homage to the Air Force's general in-
terests in "instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de
corps", 42 but did not cite any portions of the trial record that indi-
cated that a screening system for granting some exemptions could
not be designed or was unworkable. 4 ' The Court did not distin-
guish between general and particularized military interests, nor did
it require the government to introduce substantial evidence dem-
onstrating that Goldman's religious observance posed any concrete
threats to any interest. In short, the Court did not invoke the
Court's compelling interest criterion or its balancing test.
Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist stated, with no apparent
reservation or qualifications, that the military's perceived need for
uniformity justifies a "review of military regulations challenged on
First Amendment grounds [that] is far more deferential than con-
stitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civil-
ian society."' 44 Accordingly, the Court applied "a subrational-basis
standard-absolute, uncritical 'deference to the professional judg-
ment of military authorities.' ",45 Justice Rehnquist opined that
"'[j]udicial deference . . . is at its apogee when legislative action
under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and
make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged.' "14
The Court did not require the Air Force to provide a reasoned
explanation 47 for not making an exception for the rabbi, and it
now appears that the military establishment has no duty to accom-
141. Goldman, 530 F. Supp. at 16.
142. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1313.
143. Justice Blackmun dissented because, inter alia, the Air Force failed to show "how
many are likely to seek religious exemptions from the dress code." Id. at 1323.
144. Id. at 1313.
145. Id. at 1317 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1313).
146. Id. at 1313 (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)) (where the Supreme
Court upheld Congress' judgment that males but not females were required to register in
order to comply with the Military Selective Service Act). The Court also cited Chappell v.
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980), Schlessinger v. Council-
man, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), and Orloff, 345 U.S. 83.
Although these cases indicate that the military is a specialized society separate and apart
from civilian society, none of these cases involved free exercise of religion claims for
exemptions.
147. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1318 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The "reasoned explanation"
test is a word of art and refers to a normal requirement of administrative law. See Section of
Administrative Law, American Bar Association, A Restatement of Scope of Review Doc-
trine, 38 AD.IIN. L. REv. 235-36 (1986).
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modate individuals who need exemptions for religious reasons. 1 8
That is the bad news; 14 9 the good news is that-if the Court's ex-
planation is taken at face value-Goldman has few, if any, implica-
tions outside of the military's sphere of influence. 150 On the other
hand, Justice Stevens' concurrence advocates the exercise of judi-
cial deference in many other areas of governmental regulation.' 5 '
Some courts have already held, in effect, that prisons are also
institutions where deference to the needs of the prison administra-
tors is appropriate.15 2 School authorities in Tennessee argue that
the desires and interests of school children and their parents need
to be subordinated to their interests in exceptionless uniformity
"for all who are enrolled in the public schools."' 53 The indications
are that Justice Stevens will be receptive to this kind of argument.
He wants to discard the balancing test in nearly all cases when
there is no evident discrimination in favor of or against religious
sects, denominations, and faiths. He believes that the government's
need for exceptionless uniformity is consistent with the Court's in-
terest in "complete neutrality toward religion.' 54 If Goldman is an
example of complete neutrality, Stevens stacks the deck against
the individual whose religious scruples cry out for a more benevo-
lent approach.
The complete neutrality approach of Justice Stevens advances
secularism at the expense of religion.155 Justice Stevens apparently
is concerned about equal treatment of all religious sects more than
he is concerned about the burdens suffered by an individual whose
religious freedom is unfairly burdened by nondiscriminatory laws.
This position exalts equality at the expense of religious liberty.
When Christians, Hindus, Moslems and adherents to all other reli-
gious faiths are treated exactly alike, it does not ameliorate the
dilemma of a rabbi who is ordered not to wear his yarmulke in-
148. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1314.
149. See Michelman, Foreward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 5-17
(1986); Note, Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 163 (1986).
150. See Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1313; Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981).
151. Michelman, supra note 149, at 8.
152. Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1986); Elam v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 582
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 868 (1973). But see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972)
(reasonable opportunities had to be afforded all prisoners to exercise their religious freedom
without fear of penalty).
153. Appellant's brief, supra note 43, at 40, 50-52.
154. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1316 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985)).
155. McConnell, supra note 2, at 14.
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doors-if the nondiscriminatory law makes his perceived fulfill-
ment of his religious duty impossible. 156
The rabbi's religion may not require of him what the deities of
the other religions require. Therefore, the rabbi's religious duty to
disobey a valid, generally applicable law is not diminished because
other individuals who are not Orthodox Jews are within the ambit
of the same laws. Several decades ago, Justice Douglas opposed
this strict and inflexible neutrality principle. He wrote, "[t]he fact
that the ordinance is 'non-discriminatory' is immaterial. ' 157 Justice
Douglas recognized that generally applicable, nondiscriminatory
laws can be used as a pretext "for the suppression of religious mi-
norities."' 58 Justice Stevens, however, ignores the possibility that
lawmakers who aim at religious minorities can now hit their target
by (equally) oppressing all religions.
Freedom from discrimination on religious grounds, of course, is
only one facet of religious liberty;159 it is not the whole enchilada.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's seminal cases 60 support "the conclu-
sion that religious liberty is an independent liberty [independent
from the equal protection guarantee and freedom of speech]."' 61
To secure religious liberty from laws that affect some individuals
more severely than others, courts in some instances "may either
require or permit preferential treatment on religious grounds."' 62
The free exercise clause, as it is usually understood, recognizes
that each individual is unique. Thus, even when laws appear to
treat everyone alike, each unique individual's integrity as a moral
actor is threatened if the law compels him to disavow his religious
scruples. It is not necessarily an establishment of religion when a
particular individual's religious needs are accommodated. 63 It is
156. In People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964), the court
emphasized that the consumption of peyote was central to the worship of the Native Ameri-
can Church. Absolute prohibition of its use would make the practice of that religion
impossible.
157. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
158. Id.
159. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 17 (1964).
160. See infra Section V.
161. P. KAUPER, supra note 159, at 17.
162. Id.
163. Although there is tension between the establishment and free exercise clauses, they
complement each other and dictate the same results because "there is room for play in the
joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist
without sponsorship and without interference." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669
(1970).
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often unjust, unfair, and cruel to punish persons who sincerely be-
lieve in the necessity of their act. The great Justices do not confuse
group rights with the rights of the individual.
Justice Stevens apparently believes that his preference for a
completely "neutral principle" absolves the Court of responsibility
when its case ruling imposes a hardship on the individual exercis-
ing his religious freedom.6 4 He fails to realize that the free exercise
clause is not so neutral that it diminishes the government's duty to
respect each individual's desire for spiritual experiences and devel-
opment.16 5 Justice Murphy wrote that the "right of freedom to be-
lieve, freedom to worship one's Maker according to the dictates of
one's conscience [is] a right which the Constitution specifically
shelters. Reflection has convinced me that as a judge I have no
loftier duty or responsibility than to uphold that spiritual freedom
to its farthest reaches. 7166
Justice Stevens wants to abandon the Court's balancing test be-
cause the government's interest in exceptionless "uniformity...
has a dimension that is of still greater importance . . . .It is the
interest in uniform treatment for the members of all religious
faiths.'16 7 This "principle of uniformity"'6 8 is circular, as applied
in Goldman, and is tantamount to an abdication of the Court's re-
sponsibility to immunize the individual from government regula-
tion unless the government shows, in each concrete case, that its
refusal to grant an exemption to the litigant is justified by an intel-
ligible imperative. 69 If Justice Stevens' deferential approach is
substituted for the Court's ad hoc balancing, the religious freedom
of the individual can be seriously burdened whenever the legisla-
ture arguably has a rational basis to enact a law 170 designed to
164. See Michelman, supra note 149, at 15.
165. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development:
Part L The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1426 (1967).
166. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J.,
concurring).
167. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1316 (Stevens, J., concurring).
168. Id.
169. But see Gillette, 401 U.S. 437. The Court in Gillette reaffirmed the principle that
"even as to neutral prohibitory or regulatory laws having secular aims, the Free Exercise
Clause may condemn certain applications clashing with imperatives of religion and con-
science, [only] when the burden on First Amendment values is not justifiable in terms of the
Government's valid aims." Id. at 462.
170. During World War II, the Supreme Court noted that governments were not permit-
ted to interfere with religious liberty unless it was necessary to "prevent grave and immedi-
ate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639.
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further the majority's interest in public convenience and
comfort.171
Unlike Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor believes that the Court
should balance competing interests in each free exercise
case-whether or not the challenged regulation is based on mili-
tary expertise, the expertise of prison administrators, or school
authorities,
because [if] the government is attempting to override an interest
specifically protected by the Bill of Rights, the government must
show that the opposing interest it asserts is of especial importance
before there is any chance that its claim can prevail. [Moreover],
since the Bill of Rights is expressly designed to protect the individ-
ual against the aggregated and sometimes intolerant powers of the
state, the government must show that the interest asserted will in
fact be substantially harmed by granting the type of exemption re-
quested by the individual. 172
Justice O'Connor dissented in Goldman because the district
court's findings of fact disclosed that the rabbi's yarmulke had
never caused any discontent or breach of discipline. 173 More signif-
icantly, she, "alone among the Justices, unambiguously affirms the
past practice of strict scrutiny,' 7 4 even in military cases. 7 5
Justice Stevens, however, is not willing to place any heavy bur-
den of persuasion on the government when an individual chal-
lenges "the application of neutral general laws. . . . In [his] opin-
ion, it is the objector who must shoulder the burden of
demonstrating that there is a unique reason for allowing him a spe-
cial exemption from a valid law of general applicability.' 7 6 If this
position is adopted by the Court in nonmilitary cases, the level of
strict scrutiny will be substantially diminished from the three sem-
171. But see Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. There the Court declared firmly that "[tihe very
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects . . . beyond the reach of
legislative majorities and officials." Id. at 638.
172. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1325 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 1326.
174. Michelman, supra note 149, at 35-36.
175. Justice Brennan's approach in military cases is more ambiguous. At one point he
seems to apply the compelling interest test, but "[a]t another point he states that it is not
the Court's province to second-guess professional military judgments but rather 'to assure
ourselves that there exists a rational foundation for assertions of military necessity when
they interfere with the free exercise of religion.'" Id. at 36 (quoting Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at
1321).
176. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 262 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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inal cases: Thomas v. Review Board, 77 Wisconsin v. Yoder,178 and
Sherbert v. Verner.17
9
V. THE SEMINAL CASES
Sherbert v. Verner 8 ° is a seminal case because the Supreme
Court held that a state is constitutionally compelled to carve out a
special exemption for individuals whose religious activities disqual-
ify them from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. The
challenged state law appeared to be a valid, generally applicable
governmental regulation. The burdens imposed upon Mrs. Sher-
bert were incidental, inadvertent by-products of a law that was not
intended to discriminate on the basis of religion. Nevertheless, the
Court balanced competing interests and took a significant step be-
yond prior precedent.
Mrs. Sherbert was discharged by her employer because she
would not work on the Sabbath day of her faith. She could not find
work elsewhere because of her observance of the Sabbath on Satur-
day.181 The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act pro-
vided that a claimant is ineligible for unemployment insurance
benefits "[iflf. . . he [or she] has failed, without good cause . . . to
accept available suitable work when offered him [or her]."'18 2 A re-
ligious objection to Saturday work was not considered good cause.
Consequently, Sherbert's claim for benefits was denied by the state
agency administering the program.
The South Carolina court observed that Sherbert's statutory in-
eligibility "'places no restriction upon [her] . . . freedom of reli-
gion nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her right
and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the
177. 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that a state unemployment compensation rule may not
be applied to deny benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job rather than produce
weapons for war).
178. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that a compulsory school-attendance law may not be
applied to Amish parents who objected on religious grounds).
179. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a Seventh-Day Adventist must be exempted from a
state's requirement of availability during her Saturday Sabbath). Sherbert was reaffirmed in
Hobie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987).
180. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
181. Had the appellant observed her Sabbath on Sunday, the laws of South Carolina
would not have required her to work. Id. at 406. Thus the statutory scheme operated to
discriminate against persons who observe their Sabbath on days other than Sunday. Id. The
Court, however, focused its attention not on the discriminatory effect of the law but upon
the magnitude of the state's interference with appellant's first amendment rights. Id.
182. Id. at 401.
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dictates of her conscience.' "183 The state supreme court's observa-
tion was accurate in this sense: no criminal statute made the obser-
vance of the Sabbath on Saturday an illegal act, and the state was
not exacting from Sherbert any tax that inhibited her activities. In
fact, Sherbert was seeking financial benefits from the state. Argua-
bly, she wanted the statute to provide her with financial aid to
compensate her for losses sustained as a result of her religious
convictions.
In the judgment of the Supreme Court, "an indirect result"184 of
the legislation, as applied, forced Sherbert "to choose between fol-
lowing the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in
order to accept work, on the other hand." '85 The Court implicitly
held that persons who were unavailable for Saturday work for non-
religious, personal reasons were not similarly situated with persons
protected by the free exercise clause. 18  The Court held that the
statute, although it does not discriminate against religion on its
face, has eligibility requirements that condition Sherbert's entitle-
ment upon her "willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her
religious faith [which] effectively penalizes the free exercise of her
constitutional liberties.118 7 In the Court's view, "[g]overnmental
imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the
free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant
for her Saturday worship." 88 This burden on Mrs. Sherbert's reli-
gious freedom was not justified by a compelling state interest. 89
The Court might have been influenced by the fact that some
nonreligious, personal reason for not accepting employment might
constitute good cause. 190 There was a hint of religious discrimina-
tion in the administration of the program,' 9' and the suspicion of
183. Id. at 401 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 303-04, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746
(1962)).
184. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
185. Id. at 404.
186. See id. at 409-10; see also id. at 401-02 n.4.
187. Id. at 406.
188. Id. at 404.
189. Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). "No. . .words can
describe just how weighty a governmental interest must be before it suffices to permit a
particular form of regulation or prohibition . . . ." Greenawalt, All or Nothing At All: The
Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 31, 76.
190. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401-02 n.4.
191. The Court also noted that South Carolina law "expressly saves the Sunday worship-
per from having to make the kind of choice which we here hold infringes the Sabbatarian's
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religious discrimination by the state'92 often justifies the strictest
scrutiny. 193 Thus, the full significance of Sherbert was not clear.
Braunfeld v. Brown"" was not overruled. In Braunfeld, the Court
refused to compel Pennsylvania authorities to exempt Orthodox
Jews from a Sunday closing law. According to the Court, Pennsyl-
vania's "strong state interest in providing one uniform day of rest
for all workers. . . .could be achieved. . only by declaring Sun-
day to be that day of rest. Requiring exceptions for Sabbatarians
... would have rendered the entire statutory scheme unwork-
able. 1' 9 5 In other words, a system for granting religious exemptions
appeared "to present an administrative problem of such magni-
tude, or to afford the exempted class so great a competitive advan-
tage, that such a requirement would have rendered the entire stat-
utory scheme [unmanageable]. "' 91 In sum, the following guideline
governs both Sherbert and Braunfeld: a paramount overriding in-
terest in uniformity might subordinate the individual's interest in
free exercise of religion whenever court-imposed exemptions would
render ineffectual a complex and important statutory scheme.
The governmental interest in uniformity, although present in
Braunfeld, was not compelling in Sherbert'e' because South Caro-
lina already had set in place the administrative procedure for
processing claims based on good cause.' 8 There was no similar
procedure set up in Pennsylvania. Moreover, although Pennsylva-
religious liberty." Id. at 406.
192. The Supreme Court majority thought it more appropriate to compare the situation
of Saturday worshippers with that of Sunday worshippers who were not disadvantaged by
the law. Justice Harlan, who dissented, compared persons like the appellant, who are not
entitled by the Constitution to get unemployment benefits because of their religious reasons,
with those whose personal reasons are not religious and therefore not within the scope of the
exemption to state law carved out by the Court. See id. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan thought that this was favoritism, and Justice Stewart suggested that such
favoritism presented an establishment clause problem. Id. at 414-17 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). Thus, the characterization of an exemption for persons with religious convictions can
be viewed as a permissibly protective measure that guards against unequal treatment, or as
impermissible favoritism, and this depends upon what groups are being compared. See
Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L.
REV. 817, 825 (1984).
193. The compelling interest test is often used as a method to flush out and expose un-
constitutional motivation if the Court suspects that the government is guilty of invidious
discrimination against discrete and insular minorities.
194. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
195. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408-09.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. The Supreme Court was influenced in Sherbert by the fact that some personal rea-
sons for refusing work constituted good cause. See id. at 401-02 n.4.
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nia law imposed a criminal penalty on nearly all businessmen open
on Sunday, Jewish businessmen were able to observe their Sab-
bath. Although the necessity of staying closed on Saturday and
Sunday was economically disadvantageous, an exemption for Jew-
ish merchants permitting them to stay open on Sunday might pro-
vide them with a great competitive advantage in their commercial
dealings. The Supreme Court does not give much weight to the
claim of a person seeking a religiously based exemption for busi-
ness activities. This is because the purity of the religious claim is
diluted, and because exemptions for businessmen often cause un-
compensated hardships for other members of society (i.e.,
competitors). 199
When religious beliefs overlap with secular self-interest, espe-
cially when it is difficult to determine the sincerity of many claim-
ants' religious beliefs, the government's interest in avoiding admin-
istrative difficulty becomes more compelling. Thus, the interest in
avoiding administrative nightmares can override religion-based
rights, even though administrative convenience does not seem as
important as national security, the prevention of physical violence,
or the prevention of some extraordinary catastrophe. Recently,
Justice O'Connor has indicated that she recognizes that usually the
prevention of welfare fraud is both "laudable and compelling. '20 0
In Sherbert, South Carolina's counsel argued that the filing of
spurious claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objec-
tions to Saturday work might dilute the unemployment compensa-
tion fund. But the state did not shoulder its burden of persuasion;
it merely suggested the possibility of spurious claims. No evidence
was introduced to substantiate the argument; indeed, the argu-
ment had never been presented to the South Carolina Supreme
199. In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985), an employer was forced by
Connecticut law to provide his employees with the absolute and unqualified right not to
work on their chosen Sabbath. Conversely, the statute imposed on employers an absolute
duty to conform his business practices to the particular religious practices of an employee
who unilaterally may designate any day as his Sabbath. The Court held that "[t]his unyield-
ing weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests contravenes a fundamen-
tal principle of the Religion Clauses. . . .The statute has a primary effect that impermissi-
bly advances a particular religious practice." Id. at 2918. The Court was also concerned
about the effect of the statute on other employees who were not only discriminated against,
but called upon to make sacrifices. Id. at 2918 n.9. Thus, the accommodation for some em-
ployees infringed on the rights of others calling for sacrifices that were intolerable. But see
McConnell, supra note 2, at 50-59.
200. Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2166 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part).
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Court.201
The Supreme Court in Sherbert intensified the means-focused
element 20 2 of its balancing test, more so than in earlier cases, by
making specific reference to the less restrictive alternative test in
the context of a free exercise clause case. The Court stated that
"even if the possibility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute
the fund and disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be
incumbent upon the [state] to demonstrate that no alternative
forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing
First Amendment rights. '20 3
Wisconsin v. Yoder 20 4 was a more difficult case because, unlike
Sherbert, there was no hint of religious discrimination. Once again
the Court balanced competing interests.20 5 The trial record in
Yoder disclosed that the Amish "believed that by sending their
children to high school, they would .. .expose themselves to the
danger of the censure of the church community. . .[and] endan-
ger their own salvation and that of their children."20 6 Therefore,
asserting their first amendment rights, the Amish plaintiffs de-
clined to comply with Wisconsin's compulsory attendance law after
their children completed the eighth grade. "According to Amish
belief, higher learning tended to develop values [which] alienate
their children from God. '207 The Court was convinced that "the
State's requirement of compulsory formal education after the
eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exer-
cise of respondents' religious beliefs. '20 8 Therefore, the Court
stated that "[i]t must appear . . . there is a state interest of suffi-
cient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under
the Free Exercise Clause."20 9
The state failed to show that the exemption demanded by Yoder
201. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
202. The Court does not have to decide that a state's interests are not compelling if the
state could have used a different "means" to advance its interests, particularly if less restric-
tive means are feasible and available.
203. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
204. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
205. In order to protect the Amish sect's religious beliefs and activities from the burdens
imposed by governmental regulation, the Court carved out an exemption from the state's
compulsory school attendance law. Id. at 234.
206. Id. at 209.
207. L. PFEFFER, supra note 79, at 59.
208. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219.
209. Id. at 214.
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seriously interfered with the educational mission of the state. The
burden of persuasion in cases involving exemptions from school
laws on religious grounds, however, is not entirely on the state. In-
deed, the Court apparently requires litigants seeking exemptions
from generally applicable educational requirements to demonstrate
that exemptions do not interefere with the state's especially impor-
tant educational goals. This allocation of the burden of persuasion
is justifiable because the plaintiffs usually have sole access to the
evidence that discloses whether the child is being instructed
outside of the school systems-although some individuals who
teach their children at home have religious scruples that prevent
them from disclosing their teaching methods. The Amish plaintiffs,
however, were willing to introduce evidence that proved that the
alternative methods of informal education provided by the Amish
to their children adequately furthered the interests "that the State
advance[d] in support of its program of compulsory high school
education. ' 210 In view of the impressive evidence introduced by
counsel,211 the Court held that "it was incumbent on the State to
show with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in
compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an
exemption to the Amish.M12
Although its level of scrutiny was strict, the Court left no doubt
that a state's interests in education will, in appropriate cases, jus-
tify the denial of exemptions from compulsory attendance laws. In-
deed, the state's general interest in "[p]roviding public schools
ranks at the very apex of the function of a State." 13 The Court
will probably continue to dismiss appeals like those in the compan-
ion cases of Donner v. New York and Auster v. Weberman.1 4 In
210. Id. at 235.
211. The trial pratice lesson to be learned is valuable. Counsel seeking exemptions from
particular parts of a regulatory program should show that the program can be redesigned to
accommodate individuals who have no desire to interfere with the entire program's overall
effectiveness. If plaintiff's counsel makes a prima facie showing, and if the ordinary balanc-
ing test is applied, the government runs the risk of nonpersuasion, for it must demonstrate
that the suggested-allegedly reasonable-alternatives to exceptionless uniformity is
unworkable.
In shouldering its burden of proof, the government cannot depend merely on rhetoric that
refers to the undifferentiated fears of its officials. Rhetoric that refers to a speculative
parade of horribles is not an adequate substitute for proof, and mere apprehensions, stand-
ing alone, should never justify any enforceable restriction of religious activity protected by
the free exercise clause. Otherwise, the free exercise clause becomes a virtual nullity.
212. Id. at 236.
213. Id. at 213.
214. 342 U.S. 884 (1951), dismissing appeal from 100 N.E.2d 57 (1951).
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those cases, the state courts ruled that "the Free Exercise Clause
did not protect the right of ultra-Hasidic parents to send their
children to a probably unique yeshivah (Orthodox Jewish all-day
school) in which no secular subjects were taught because all knowl-
edge was to be found in Torah and Talmudic writings." 15
However, Yoder indicates that when school authorities refuse re-
ligiously based exemptions, the state's interests in preparing stu-
dents to become self-reliant, self-sufficient and politically aware
citizens 216 are not always compelling. Resolution of the question
whether the state's particularized interests are compelling depends
on the facts in each individual case. In religious controversies in-
volving challenges to school laws, the Court admits that it is "ill-
equipped to determine the 'necessity' of discrete aspects of a
State's program of compulsory education.121 7 Understandably, the
Court in Yoder admonished lower courts to "move with great cir-
cumspection in performing the sensitive and delicate task of
weighing a State's legitimate social concern when faced with reli-
gious claims for exemptions from generally applicable educational
requirements. ' 218 Nevertheless, the Court held that the interests
advanced by the state-although perhaps sufficiently compelling in
some cases-emerged "as somewhat less substantial," 9 given the
trial record, which amply supported the argument that the Amish's
on-the-farm training in practical skills was more suitable for
Amish children than the state's program.22 °
Additional litigation was fomented by language in the Court's
opinion in Yoder 221 suggesting that persons seeking religiously
based exemptions were required to demonstrate that the belief on
which their claim was based is "a central, fundamental, important,
215. L. PFEFFER, supra note 79, at 60-61. Thus, there no longer appears to be any ques-
tion that states may require parents to provide their children with the minimum essentials
of a basic secular education, either at home or in public or private schools.
216. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
217. Id. at 235.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 228.
220. Id. at 228-29.
221. The Court's guidance in many respects presents more questions than it answers. See,
e.g., id. at 224-26. For example, there is some question whether the state's interest in pre-
paring students to become socialized within the conventional mainstream of our society is
ever important enough to subordinate the interests of parents whose religious convictions
require them to train their children to live in religious communities that are kept separate
from the mainstream. This ambiguity makes the issues in the Tennessee textbook case more
difficult to resolve.
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or essential part of their faith." '222 Justice Brennan subsequently
wrote that it is necessary to consider the "sincerity and centrality"
of the objection to the claimant's religion.22 This language empha-
sizing the need to show that the conviction upon which the free
exercise claim rests is "an essential part of. . .religious belief and
practice"224 is questioned by some commentators because it in-
volves some "subjective judgments about how sincere a particular
group is, how important various beliefs and practices are to it, and
how adversely the public interest will be affected by a special ex-
emption. ' 225 However, the Court's concern about centrality is an
aspect of the Court's balancing test, not a sine qua non of a legiti-
mate free exercise claim.226
Because the trial record disclosed that it is relatively easy to de-
termine the sincerity and intensity of an Amish parent's claim that
his religion requires him to separate his children from the world,227
it is not enormously difficult to process such claims,228 particularly
since the governing statute already contemplated a procedure to
determine if school-age children have a "legal excuse" for not at-
tending school.229 The Yoder Court also noted that some states al-
ready have voluntarily "developed working arrangements with the
Amish regarding high school attendance. '230  Yoder's counsel
demonstrated that practicable, less restrictive alternatives were
available. In short, the administration of a system that permitted
exemptions for Amish individuals, and other individuals similarly
222. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the
Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 900 n.189 (1984) (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210-19).
223. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 635 n.8 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
224. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219.
225. Johnson, supra note 192, at 842. Professor Phillip Johnson adds:
In Yoder, the Court's opinion left no doubt that the decision turned largely on the
respect the Justices had for the Old Order Amish . . . .The opinion warned that
other groups with different characteristics should not necessarily expect similar treat-
ment. It is not easy to achieve this kind of outcome by a neutral application of legal
concepts; rather. . . perhaps it would be more honest simply to acknowledge that the
Court occasionally gives a deserving party a break.
Id.
226. Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 780-81; see also infra text accompanying notes 231-32.
227. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216-19.
228. As a practical matter, the threat to any regulatory program is de minimis if only a
few persons have religious objections that require them to disobey the programs' legal re-
quirement. Therefore, the Court wisely abandoned its requirement that the plaintiff prove
that many others share his religious convictions. See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying
text.
229. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207 n.2 (citing Wis. STAT. § 118.15(1)(a) (1969)).
230. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 n.9.
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situated, does not seriously interfere with the administration of
Wisconsin's compulsory attendance laws or the pursuit of its edu-
cational objectives.
Although Yoder stressed that the beliefs of Mr. Yoder were cen-
tral to his religion, Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Thomas v.
Review Board2"' disclosed that this line of inquiry is not part of
the Court's threshold test.2 2 In Thomas, an applicant for unem-
ployment benefits left his job because his "employment, once ac-
ceptable, became religiously objectionable. '233 At the hearing
before the Unemployment Review Board, Thomas, a Jehovah's
Witness, admitted that he did not object to working in a plant that
produced steel that could be used to manufacture war weapons,
but his conscience would not allow him to actually hammer the
steel into a tank. During the hearing, another Jehovah's Witness
testified that working on tanks was scripturally acceptable. Be-
cause Thomas was struggling with his own beliefs, which he did
not articulate with precision or clarity, 34 Thomas did not satisfy
the statute's requirement of good cause. 3 5
The Supreme Court reversed. Instead of determining whether
the applicant's belief was central or important to a sect, the Court
held that the narrow function of the reviewing court is to deter-
mine if the individual's own belief is an "honest conviction" that
such activity "was forbidden by his religion. 23 6 The Court added
that the "guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which
are shared by all the members of a religious sect. '27
Once the Thomas Court was convinced that the applicant's reli-
gious convictions were sincerely held, the burden of producing rele-
vant evidence to rebut the claim was entirely on the state. Eight
Justices joined in that part of the Court's opinion which made it
incumbent on the state to prove that its important goals were par-
ticularly compelling. The Court held that "the interests advanced
by the State do not justify the burden placed on the free exercise
of religion. '238
231. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
232. For a discussion of the threshold test, see supra note 11.
233. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
234. Id. at 711, 714, 715.
235. Id. at 712-13.
236. Id. at 716.
237. Id. at 715-16.
238. Id. at 719.
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The state's particularized goals were: (1) to avoid burdens on the
unemployment compensation fund "resulting if people kere per-
mitted to leave jobs for 'personal' reasons, and (2) to avoid a de-
tailed probing by employers into job applicants' religious be-
liefs. 2 39 The Court seemed to place the entire record-making
burden on the attorneys for the state agency. This was a fair allo-
cation of the risk of nonpersuasion since the government agency,
rather than the plaintiff, had access to nearly all the relevant
evidence.
The Court, however, did not indicate that the free exercise
claimant no longer has any obligation to make a record. For those
who viewed Thomas as an unambiguous endorsement of a balanc-
ing test that almost always tips in favor of individuals requesting
religion-based exemptions, Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
United States v. Lee14 0 must have been a surprise, and Goldman v.
Weinberger24 1 must have been a shock. The Supreme Court is be-
coming more sensitive to the government's boilerplate, administra-
tive necessity argument. It is therefore not clear whether the
Court's seminal cases illustrate the rule, or the exception, in free
exercise cases. Explanations of the Court's current position are
speculative whenever a new trend of case rulings interrupts a sta-
ble line of growth.
VI. OMINOUS OVERTONES IN RECENT OPINIONS
In the three seminal cases, the Supreme Court balanced compet-
ing interests when laws neutral on their face interfered with reli-
gious liberty. Despite governmental claims of administrative incon-
venience, the Court compelled the government to carve out special
exemptions for persons who believed that Biblical commands have
precedence over secular law. A different approach was taken in
Goldman v. Weinberger24 1 when the Court, declining to exercise its
independent judgment, rubber-stamped the Air Force's application
of dress code regulations that interfered with a rabbi's religious
liberty. Goldman illustrates the exception to the rule, requiring the
government to endure manageable administrative inconveniences
in order to make good on the guarantees of the first amendment.
239. Id. at 718-19.
240. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
241. 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986); see supra Section IV.
242. 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
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There is still a reasonable likelihood that Goldman will be limited
to a unique line of military cases.
Clearly the Supreme Court has rejected a mechanical application
of Professor Kurland's thesis: "religion may not be used as a basis
of classification for purposes of government action, whether that
action be the conferring of rights or privileges or the imposition of
duties or obligations. ' 243 Kurland, like Justice Stevens, believes in
"a 'neutral' principle of equality. ' 244 This principle, fine in theory,
does not work in practice,24 5 and might indicate insensitivity on
the part of the Court.
Needless to say, the Court cannot be unconcerned and stay in
neutral gear when the government is oppressing believers in a reli-
gious creed. Instead of sitting idly by, insensitive to the plight of
persons oppressed by laws not directly aimed at religious minori-
ties, the Court should take affirmative action and ameliorate the
disproportionately harsh effect of laws that impose undue burdens
on religion. Amelioration can best be accomplished by siding with
the oppressed individual and by granting personal exemptions if
practicable. Although this kind of judicial relief entails the use of
religion as a basis for classification, 24 as Justice White has pointed
out, "[ilt cannot be ignored that the First Amendment itself con-
tains a religious classification. '247
The Court refused to use religion as a basis for a judicially im-
posed tax exemption in United States v. Lee,248 but not because of
any principle of neutrality. After equating social security taxes
with other general taxes, the Court concluded that "[t]he tax sys-
tem could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge
the tax system because the tax payments were spent in a manner
that violates their religious belief." 2 49 The reasoning of the Court
243. P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18 (1962) quoted in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 638-39 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). Professor Kurland himself conceded that his
principle "is meant to provide a starting point for solutions to problems before the Court,
not a mechanical answer to them." Id.
244. P. KURLAND, supra note 243, at 18.
245. "Strict neutrality might indeed produce results plainly inconsistent with free exer-
cise. Must restrictions on sex discrimination in employment be applied to the hiring of Ro-
man Catholic priests?" McConnell, supra note 2, at 19.
246. This kind of judicial relief has been called "constitutional neutrality" or "benevolent
neutrality." Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
247. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (White, J., dissenting).
248. 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982).
249. Id.
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in Lee, however, neither embraces Professor Kurland's principle of
neutrality, nor abandons the Court's well established balancing
test. If we have learned anything from the Court's leading free ex-
ercise cases, it is this: the enclave of religious freedom for the indi-
vidual is determined after the Court evaluates the competing inter-
ests in the case sub judice.2 50 Unreliable as balancing tests are,
they have produced many cases which indicate that religious free-
dom, although not absolute, is a fundamental right.
This painstaking process of groping for justice does not satisfy
Justice Stevens, who prefers a more inflexible, predictable, and ob-
jective methodology.25' He admittedly advocates adoption of a
"standard that places an almost insurmountable burden on any in-
dividual who objects to a valid and neutral law of general applica-
bility on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes). 252
The majority of the Justices are resisting the entreaty of Justice
Stevens. Even after deciding Lee, the Court chose to apply the
compelling interest test, in Bob Jones University v. United
States.53 Moreover, Murdock v. Pennsylvania254 and Follett v.
McCormick255 were cited in Lee without indication of any disap-
proval.256 Murdock held that a flat license tax challenged by an
evangelist unduly burdened his religious freedom. 57 The words
"undue burden on religious freedom" simply indicate that the
Court has balanced competing interests and the scales have tipped
against the government.
In Follett, the Court agreed that a general, nondiscriminatory
license fee imposed on an evangelist who makes his living selling
250. Justice O'Connor wrote in Goldman that "the Government can present no suffi-
ciently convincing proof in this case." Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1326. She stressed the facts
found by the district court "in this particular case." Id.
251. See also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722-23 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
252. Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
253. 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). For a more detailed discussion of this case, see infra text
accompanying notes 299-306. See also Freed and Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public Policy:
Bob Jones University v. United States, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (1984); Stephan, Bob Jones
University v. United States: Public Policy in Search of Tax Policy, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 33.
(1984).
254. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
255. 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
256. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259 n.10.
257. Murdock, 319 U.S. 105.
1987]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tracts is a tax on the exercise of religion.258 But this is only the
beginning of the judicial inquiry. The inquiry does not end until
the Court determines whether a regulation which is nondiscrimina-
tory on its face unduly burdens religious liberty in its application.
The Court sided with the evangelist. Justice Murphy, concurring in
Follett, wrote, "[i]t is claimed that the effect of our decision is to
subsidize religion. But this is merely a harsh way of saying that to
prohibit the taxation of religious activities is to give substance to
the constitutional right of religious freedom. ' 25 In short, constitu-
tional neutrality "is not so narrow a channel that the slightest
deviation from an absolutely straight course" is prohibited. 60
Since Justice Stevens does not believe that Wisconsin v.
Yoder"' is consistent with Lee, he apparently thinks that Yoder,
Murdock, and Follett were incorrectly decided. 6 2 In Lee, he ex-
plained his concerns more fully:
In my opinion, the principal reason for adopting a strong pre-
sumption against such claims is not a matter of administrative con-
venience. It is the overriding interest in keeping the govern-
ment-whether it be the legislature or the courts-out of the
business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious
claims. The risk that governmental approval of some and disap-
proval of others will be perceived as favoring one religion over an-
other is an important risk the Establishment Clause was designed to
preclude.263
In Yoder, the Supreme Court was aware of the risks of violating
the establishment clause when court-ordered exemptions are
carved out from facially neutral laws of general applicability, but
noted that "danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no
matter how vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by
the right of free exercise. '264 Concededly, many cases require the
Court to risk traversing a tight rope as it tries to preserve religious
258. Follett, 321 U.S. at 577-78.
259. Id. at 578-79 (Murphy, J., concurring).
260. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
261. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
262. Justice Stevens was not a Justice of the United States Supreme Court when Yoder
was decided. In Goldman, Justice Stevens reiterated the position he stated in Lee.
Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1314-16 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also supra note 164 and ac-
companying text.
263. Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
264. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
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freedom and the autonomy of the individual "while avoiding any
semblance of established religion."26 5
Justice Stevens' concerns about the risks of violating the estab-
lishment clause are understandable,266 but his solution is not con-
sistent with the Court's seminal cases. Moreover, in Witters v.
Washington Department of Services For the Blind,6 7 the Court
indicated that financial aid to certain religious individuals does not
necessarily violate the establishment clause. Witters is a recent, al-
though somewhat hedged, affirmation of the idea that the estab-
lishment clause may not be used as a sword to justify the repres-
sion of adherents to a religion; instead, it is a shield against any
attempt to inhibit religion.28 s This is what Justice Stewart meant
when he wrote that the scope of the establishment clause prohibi-
tion is inherently limited and "compelled by the free exercise
guarantee."2 69
Justice Stevens wants to resurrect a rejected distinction between
legislatively created exemptions and exemptions that are judicially
imposed. The latter, according to a dissenter in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner,270 violates the establishment clause. 1 This distinction is weak
because the Court carves out a religiously based exemption only
after it decides that the free exercise clause requires the govern-
ment to accommodate the religious needs of an individual. Neither
the notion of strict neutrality nor nonestablishment "can account
for the idea of accommodation or define its limits. '2 72
When the Court balances competing interests, it must also be
mindful of its own test in establishment clause cases: "the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; . . . its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion
265. Walz, 397 U.S. at 672.
266. A version of Stevens' argument was advanced by Justice Rehnquist in Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and rejected in an opinion
that Stevens joined.
267. 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986). Justice Stevens joined the Supreme Court's opinion in Witters.
The Washington Supreme Court had ruled that the establishment clause precluded the
state from extending vocational rehabilitation assistance to a blind person studying for the
ministry at a Christian college. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the record on ap-
peal did not disclose that extension of financial aid violates the establishment clause.
268. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
269. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 311 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
270. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
271. Id. at 422-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
272. McConnell, supra note 2, at 3.
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* . .; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement
with religion.' ",273 Normally, however, when a court compels a
state to grant an exemption for a particular individual, there is no
excessive entanglement. Moreover, the Court's desire to guarantee
the free exercise of religion is a secular purpose, and the primary
effect of any court-ordered exemption does not advance religion
improperly if accommodation is required by the free exercise
clause. Recall that the judicial remedies required in Murdock and
Follett were financial subsidies in the form of a fiscal exemption,
but the Court's opinions clearly indicated that not all financial
subsidies to secure the free exercise of religion violate the estab-
lishment clause. As Justice White wrote in dissent in Committee
for Public Education & Religious Freedom v. Nyquist, 74 the
Court's decisions in controversies involving the establishment
clause "have carved out what they deemed to be the most desirable
national policy governing various aspects of church-state
relationships. ,275
Exemptions for religious dissenters discriminate in favor of reli-
gion, but "our whole constitutional history refutes the argument
that what is meant by religious liberty is a principle directed
against preferential or discriminatory treatment on religious
grounds. ' 276 Indeed, the Supreme Court's decisions have, as Paul
Kauper wrote:
elevated religious liberty to the position of a preferred freedom, not
only because religious activities cannot be abridged except for clear
and compelling reasons related to the public interest, but also be-
cause in some situations the legislature may, and in other situations
must, take the religious factor into account as a basis for preferen-
tial treatment under tax and regulatory laws.277
"It is sometimes forgotten that religious liberty [not separation of
church and state] is the central value and animating purpose of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. '278
The Court's seminal cases follow the best of our traditions be-
273. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The three prong purpose, effect
and entanglement test is restated in Witters, 106 S. Ct. at 751.
274. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
275. Id. at 820 (White, J., dissenting).
276. P. KAUPER, supra note 159, at 17.
277. Id. at 43-44.
278. McConnell, supra note 2, at 1.
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cause the majority of the Justices have demonstrated over the
years their respect for the place religion occupies in the life of seri-
ous believers.279 Justice Stevens, however, distinguished Sherbert
and Thomas v. Review Board28 0 on the ground that the Supreme
Court's intervention "could be viewed as a protection against une-
qual treatment."' 81 Perhaps Justice Stevens' campaign for the
complete neutrality principle influenced Chief Justice Burger,
whose plurality opinion in Bowen v. Roy28 2 resounds with ominous
overtones.
Roy, a Native American and member of the Abenaki Tribe, ob-
jected on religious grounds to the government's use of the number
that identified his daughter.283 The Court held that the govern-
ment's use of any number, already issued, does not unduly burden
the applicant's exercise of religion.8 4 Chief Justice Burger's appar-
ent alliance with Justice Stevens surfaced in connection with an-
other distinct claim made by Roy, who also wanted an exemption
from the requirement that he furnish his daughter's number to the
state agency as a condition of eligibility under the state's Aid to
Families with Dependent Children plan.285 Roy believed he was be-
ing forced to harm his daughter's "spirit" each time he furnished
his daughter's number on benefit applications.
The evidence showed that the government's computers are capa-
ble of identifying Roy's daughter without her number and that
only four other challenges to the government's requirements were
reported.8 6 Accordingly, the district court enjoined the govern-
ment from denying the benefits to Roy's daughter because of his
failure to furnish the number already established as her identi-
fier.287 On appeal, this issue was not resolved by the Court. How-
ever, Chief Justice Burger wanted to resolve the issue, and he
wrote, "[iln the enforcement of a facially neutral and uniformly
279. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
280. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
281. Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
282. 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
283. Id. at 2150-51.
284. Id. at 2151.
285. Id. at 2153.
286. Roy v. Cohen, 590 F. Supp. 600, 612 (M.D, Pa. 1984), vacated sub nom. Bowen v.
Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
287. Roy, 590 F. Supp. at 614. The record was not crystal clear that Roy was actually
under any further obligation to furnish this number, and therefore Justice Stevens refused
to resolve the issue, Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2160-64 (Stevens, J., concurring in part), and Justice
Blackmun addressed the issue only in part. Id. at 2160 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
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applicable requirement for the administration of welfare programs
reaching millions of people, the Government is entitled to wide
latitude."28
The Chief Justice not only refused to apply strict scrutiny,2"' but
he also invoked a rational basis test stating, "[a]bsent proof of an
intent to discriminate against particular religious beliefs or against
religion in general, the Government meets its burden when it dem-
onstrates that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits,
neutral and uniform in its application, is a reasonable means of
promoting a legitimate public interest."2 90 Thomas and Sherbert
were distinguished by the Chief Justice as cases already involving
"a mechanism for individualized exemptions," and involving wel-
fare programs that exhibited "hostility, not neutrality, towards re-
ligion" because religiously motivated reasons were not considered
"good cause" for refusing employment.291 Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, and White, however, indicated, ei-
ther expressly or implicitly, that the applicant's objection to fur-
nishing his daughter's number on each benefit application required
"a straight forward application of Sherbert, Thomas and ...
Yoder. ' 292 Although Justice Blackmun thought the record was in-
adequate for a definitive decision on the claim, he indicated that
"the Government may not deny assistance to [Roy's daughter]
solely because the parents' religious convictions prevent them from
supplying the Government with a social security number. ' 293 Jus-
tice White dissented on the ground that Thomas and Sherbert
controlled the outcome of both claims. 94
Justice O'Connor (whose opinion was joined by Justices Mar-
shall and Brennan) accurately observed that the government had
not shown that a rigid requirement forcing Roy to furnish his
daughter's number was necessary to prevent fraud and abuse,295 or
that "a significant number of other individuals were likely to make
288. Id. at 2156.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 2160. Justice Stevens did not reach the second claim because, in his view, it
was "either moot or not ripe for decision." Id. at 2161-62 (Stevens J., concurring in part and
concurring in result).
293. Id. at 2160 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
294. Id. at 2169.
295. Id. at 2166.
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a claim similar to that at issue here." '296 Justice O'Connor ex-
pressed dismay that the Chief Justice found it "necessary to in-
voke a new standard to be applied to test the validity of govern-
ment regulations under the Free Exercise Clause. 2 97 In her view:
Such a test has no basis in precedent and relegates a serious First
Amendment value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny that the
Equal Protection Clause already provides. I would apply our long
line of precedents to hold that the Government must accommodate
a legitimate free exercise claim unless pursuing an especially impor-
tant interest by narrowly tailored means. 98
Justice O'Connor's approach, like the approach of the Court in the
seminal cases, adds up to an ad hoc balancing test with the scales
usually tipped in favor of the claimant.
However, the Court is not always prepared to tip the scales in
favor of the claimant. For example, in Bob Jones University v.
United States,299 the Court, without indicating what evidence sup-
ported its judgment, held that no less restrictive means, other than
a denial of a religious school's tax exempt status, can demonstrate
the government's disapproval of a racially discriminatory private
school. Arguably, the Court decided that a religious exemption in-
terferes with its own compelling constitutionalized policy 300 of
eradicating racially discriminatory education.0 1
In Bob Jones, "Chief Justice Burger disposed of the constitu-
tional issue in two pages, with no reference to the justifications for
the special place of religion" in our Constitution.0 2 One commen-
296. Id. at 2167. The district court found that there had only been four reported cases
involving religiously based challenges to the social security number requirement for welfare
benefits. Id.
297. Id. at 2166.
298. Id. Justice O'Connor's position was endorsed by the Court in Hobbie v. Unemploy-
ment Appeals Comm'n, 167 S. Ct. 1046, 1049 (1987).
299. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
300. Bob Jones is a unique case because the Court took the lead when it encouraged all
branches of the government to eradicate racial discrimination in education. None of the
Justices are willing to countenance foot dragging by recalcitrant, segregated institutions,
regardless of their proprietors' religious convictions. Nevertheless, if the Court continues to
make exceptions to its normal policy of heightened scrutiny, the potency of the free exercise
guarantee will diminish.
301. Justice O'Connor clarified Bob Jones by noting that the interest balanced against the
religious interests of the university "was not merely a compelling governmental interest, but
a constitutional interest." Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2167-68 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
302. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 83, 122
(1984).
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tator suggested that some "fundamentalist Protestant groups may
seem to these Justices . . . [as] heretics who disrupt the social har-
mony by disavowing a major article of the American creed."30 3 If
so, the prospects for the fundamentalists' success in the appeal of
Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools304 will diminish if the
secular relativism inculcated by school textbooks becomes consti-
tutionalized as another article of the American creed. 5 It will be
interesting to see if the appellate courts cater to those who think
the fundamentalist plaintiffs are ignorant "heretics who disrupt so-
cial harmony,"30 6 or whether the courts will continue to balance
the competing interests of devout individuals and secular
educators.
VII. THE TENNESSEE TEXTBOOK CASE
Several fundamentalists began battling with school authorities
shortly after the Hawkins County Board of Education recom-
mended compulsory use of the 1983 edition of the Holt, Rhinehart
and Winston basic reading series in the public schools. In the Holt
series there were references to witchcraft and magic, selections
that commented favorably on rebellion against parental authority,
and materials that implied certain theories of evolution were indis-
putably truthful. Although most parents do not object to their
children's exposure to the Holt series, parental concern about cur-
riculum requirements are not limited to Hawkins County. As a
1976 article in the New York Times stated:
As America's children return to school, many conscientious parents
are genuinely uncertain whether they may be delivering their chil-
dren into enemy territory .... Much of America's popular culture
adds up to a conspiracy to destroy the innocence of youth and to
force upon children premature knowledge and ways of acting that
they can understand intellectually but not cope with emotionally.30 7
303. Id. at 123.
304. 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
305. Emboldened by Goldman, by the position of Chief Justice Burger in Bob Jones and
Roy, and by Justice Stevens' hard-line position, the Court will surely seek to expand the
idea that the government's interest in uniformity of treatment in public schools is itself a
compelling interest. This argument, in most cases, adds up to a euphemism for the ipse
dixit that rules are rules, which would effectively guarantee victory for the government in
every case.
306. Smith, supra note 302, at 123.
307. Shannon, Too Much, Too Soon, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1976, at 37, col. 5, quoted in J.
WHITEHEAD, THE STEALING OF AMERICA 88 (1983).
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James J. Kilpatrick, who disagrees that the fundamentalists have
rights to withdraw their children from a class in reading instruc-
tion, admits that "religion has been washed out of [the textbooks].
The child who learns from these texts will learn nothing of the role
of the church in American history."30 Kilpatrick adds, "[t]he one
minority that has been consistently put down [by the school texts]
is the minority of white Protestant fundamentalists. '" 30 9 The relief
sought by the plaintiffs included a court order that prevented the
county's public school system from forcing impressionable children
to consider ethical relativism as an alternative to their parents' Bi-
ble-based religious convictions.
The controversy between the fundamentalist plaintiffs and
school authorities is similar to many cases that arise when the gov-
ernment acts neutrally with respect to religion, extending its bene-
fits and burdens among a wide range of persons without regard to
religion. The issue in such cases is whether religious persons are
entitled to special exemptions or protections.3 10
The district court enjoined the school authorities from requiring
the student-plaintiffs to read from the Holt series,31' and officials
were ordered "to allow the student-plaintiffs to attend the Haw-
kins County public schools without participating in the course of
reading instruction. ' 31 2 School authorities were also ordered to ex-
cuse the student-plaintiffs from the classroom during the normal
reading period, and to provide them "with suitable space in the
library or elsewhere for a study hall." 313 The injunction provided
that "[n]o student shall be penalized for exercising" the option to
decline to participate in the public school's course of reading in-
struction, which utilized the Holt series.3 14
The order is less sweeping than it appears because state law had
previously provided the parents with a home school option. Indeed,
the order 315 provided that the student-plaintiffs could be excused
only if their parents submitted written intent of their notice to
308. Richmond News Leader, Nov. 3, 1986, at 17, col. 4. Mr. Kilpatrick was referring to
the exhaustive study of textbooks made in 1985 by Professor Paul E. Vitz of Columbia
University.
309. Id.
310. See McConnell, supra note 2, at 7.
311. Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194, 1203 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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provide home school reading instruction in accordance with the
Tennessee statute316 that allows children to be taught all subjects
at home rather than in private or public school.
In Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 1 like Wisconsin
v. Yoder,31s the state's general interest is the education of young
children pursuant to compulsory school attendance laws. Hawkins
County authorities, however, expel children from school when their
parents prevent them from reading materials that are offensive to
their religious convictions. It is not clear how the state's interest in
socialization is furthered by expelling fundamentalists. In any
event, because the state's belief in the value of the Holt textbooks
and the plaintiffs' religious values are antagonistic, the trial court
endeavored to "decide whether the state can achieve literacy and
good citizenship for all students without forcing them to read the
Holt series." 319
In order to understand that the district court's injunction is in
line with Yoder, Sherbert v. Verner,320 and Thomas v. Review
Board,3121 it is helpful to consider the following facts: shortly after
the Board of Education began using the Holt series, an organiza-
tion of parents apprised the Board "that they found the Holt se-
ries offensive to their religious beliefs. 3 22 Petitions were presented
requesting removal of the Holt series from the school, but these
petitions were properly rejected. There would be an establishment
clause violation if any court imposed the religious views of some
parents on school authorities and on any nonconsenting parent or
child. 23
The concerned parents subsequently requested school authori-
ties to provide their children with an alternative reading assign-
ment. This proposed solution did not infringe on the religious lib-
erty of others, and did not present serious establishment clause
problems.3 24 Even Justice Harlan, who dissented in Sherbert,
316. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050 (Supp. 1986).
317. 647 F. Supp. 1194.
318. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
319. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1201.
320. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
321. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
322. 647 F. Supp. at 1196.
323. Cf. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985).
324. The government may voluntarily create special religious exemptions to accommodate
an individual's religious beliefs even when the government is not compelled to do so by the
free exercise clause. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 638-39 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring);
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agreed that a state may single out religiously motivated conduct
for a special exemption as "a permissible accommodation of reli-
gion . . . if it chose to do So. ' '325 Quite properly, therefore, a school
official at Church Hill Middle School acceded to the parents' re-
quest for alternative reading assignments.326 This accommodation
hardly conveyed a message "of endorsement of a particular reli-
gious belief, to the detriment of those who do not share it. ' 327
Litigation became necessary after the school board adopted a
resolution requiring teachers to "use only textbooks adopted by
the Board of Education. '328 Thereafter, school officials at the
Church Hill Middle School told seven of the student-plaintiffs that
they would no longer be allowed to use an alternative reader. The
district court summarized the ensuing events:
[T]hese [seven] students refused, on religious grounds, to read the
Holt series or to attend the reading classes in which the Holt series
was used. They were suspended from school for three days as a re-
sult. On November 22, 1983, they were again suspended, this time
for ten (10) days, because they continued to refuse to attend reading
class and/or read the Holt books. Following this rigorous enforce-
ment of the Board's mandate [which included a third suspension],
many of the student-plaintiffs withdrew from public schools .... 319
During the early stages of litigation, Judge Hull of the district
court granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs, but this
decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit.330
The court of appeals noted that the parents "emphasized that
they were not seeking to ban the Holt books from the schools nor
did they object to its [sic] use by the rest of the student body." 331
The plaintiffs had alleged that statements made by the authors of
the Holt series show they admittedly reject "traditional Judeo-
Christian values and . . . teach contrary values. '332 The court of
see McConnell, supra note 2, at 29-41.
325. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
326. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1196.
327. Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
328. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1196.
329. Id.
330. Mozert, 582 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Tenn. 1984), rev'd and remanded, 765 F.2d 75 (6th
Cir. 1985), reh'g, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
331. Mozert, 765 F.2d at 76.
332. Id. at 77.
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appeals held that summary judgment was improper in view of the
following unresolved factual issues: (1) whether plaintiffs' religious
beliefs were sincerely held; (2) whether the Holt series books are
offensive because they are used to teach values contrary to Judeo-
Christian beliefs; (3) whether an option enabling plaintiffs' chil-
dren to learn from different books than those used by the public
schools would impair the school authorities' ability to teach
reading.3
After remand to the district court, the parties stipulated "that
the plaintiffs' beliefs were sincerely held religious convictions. '"3 3 4
The district court did not determine whether the plaintiffs' reli-
gious beliefs are central to their faith, since "[n]o Supreme Court
decision turned on the issue of whether a particular belief was cen-
tral. '335 Instead, Judge Hull simply required the plaintiffs to prove
that their beliefs and actions were "rooted in religion."336
The district court allocated the litigants' respective burdens of
proof as follows:
When deciding a free exercise claim, the courts apply a two-step
analysis. First, it must be determined whether the government ac-
tion does, in fact, create a burden on the litigant's exercise of his
religion. If such a burden is found, it must then be balanced against
the governmental interest, with the government being required to
show a compelling reason for its action.33
In addition, it must be determined whether the state has acted in a
way which constitutes "the least restrictive means of achieving
[the] . . . compelling state interest,"33 as measured by its impact
upon the plaintiffs. Although the parties subsequently stipulated
that material in the Holt series was "offensive,"339 it is not necessa-
rily an unduly oppressive burden on religious liberty when a stu-
dent is required to read offensive materials. The plaintiff-parents,
however, produced substantial evidence demonstrating that "cer-
333. Id. at 78. Other factual disputes were unresolved because school authorities argued
that the accommodation requested by plaintiffs violates the establishment clause. Id.
334. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1197.
335. Id. at 1198.
336. Id. The court cited Thomas, which stated that "beliefs rooted in religion are pro-
tected by the Free Exercise Clause." Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713.
337. Mozert, 765 F.2d at 78 (citations omitted).
338. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
339. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1199.
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tain recurring themes" 340 expressing viewpoints "repulsive to
the[ir] Christian faith"341 were not balanced by any reading mate-
rial which supports their creed.
The parents listed more than 300 objections to the Holt series
which, in their view, exposed the children to an excessive number
of selections with secular humanistic viewpoints which, they be-
lieved, were anti-Christian. This imbalance rendered the reading
assignments "so repulsive" that the parents, in good conscience,
could not "allow their children to be exposed to the Holt series. 3 42
"Clearly, government cannot teach atheism, agnosticism, or secu-
larism as a way of life. '343
Many pundits, however, are appalled that the plaintiffs are so
"closed-minded" that they object to Shakespeare's "Macbeth" and
books like the "Diary of Anne Frank." Yet, one thematic viewpoint
expressed in the Anne Frank diary denies the need to be
"[o]rthodox . .. or believe in heaven and hell. '344 The parents
were trying to convince their children that "all religions are [not]
merely different roads to God, '345 and that the one and only road
that avoids hell is the walk with Jesus Christ. On the other hand,
school authorities were attempting to get the children to think for
themselves. The reading program is designed to train children to-
criticize dogma and values established at home.
Judge Hull's fact findings disclose that the parents drew their
line because they believed sincerely that "after reading the entire
Holt series, a child might adopt the views of .. .an anti-Chris-
tian. '346 Echoing the Supreme Court, Judge Hull held that the
plaintiffs "have drawn a line, 'and it is not for us to say that the
340. Id. at 1204.
341. Id. at 1199.
342. Id. Thus, the books were not only offensive to the plaintiffs' religious beliefs, but
they also undermined the children's faith-contrary to the parents' wishes-because:
(1) [T]hey teach [the children] witchcraft in violation of Biblical precepts against
such teaching; (2) they teach that certain values, held to be absolute by appellants,
are relative depending on the situation; (3) they teach that it is proper to be disobedi-
ent to parents, despite Biblical precepts to the contrary; (4) they teach that idol wor-
ship may be beneficial and that prayer to a horse god [has been beneficial]; (5) they
teach that one can achieve salvation by simply having faith in the supernatural, with-
out necessarily believing in Jesus . . ..
Mozert, 765 F.2d at 76.
343. P. KAUPER, supra note 159, at 32.
344. Mozert, 582 F. Supp. at 202.
345. Id.
346. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1199.
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line [they] drew was an unreasonable one.' ,,347 As Judge Hull rec-
ognizes, the parents views cannot be completely ignored, yet pro-
fessional educators have the duty to train "American citizens in an
atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of
any sort-an atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heri-
tage common to all American groups and religions. '3 48 The plain-
tiff-parents believe, however, that a distorted part of the American
heritage was being communicated by the Holt series. Like the par-
ents in West Virginia v. Barnette,49 they wanted only to be ex-
cused from part of the public school's regular activities. The insu-
lation requested by the parents arguably perpetuates ignorance, as
is suggested by Norman Lear's group, People for the American
Way. Judge Hull, however, correctly held (following the guidelines
of Yoder and Thomas), that the plaintiffs are entitled to draw cer-
tain lines rooted in their religion.
The case requires the courts to balance carefully competing in-
terests. On the one hand, educators believe that children should be
exposed to a wide variety of materials, and then allowed to make
up their own minds about the truth. However, contrary to the as-
sumptions of many of their detractors, the plaintiff-fundamental-
ists believe that parents are responsible for protecting their im-
pressionable young children from repetitious exposure to
relativistic beliefs that have profound theological implications, and
which have the apparent imprimatur of the state.
The issues can be narrowed because of the conditions laid down
by school authorities. More specifically, the plaintiffs are required
to surrender either their entitlements to free public education or
their beliefs rooted in religion. Arguably the plaintiffs have to take
the bitter with the sweet, but the district court found that plain-
tiffs were confronted with a Hobson's Choice that interferes with
their free exercise of religion. 50
Although the state's generalized interests in the "education of its
young"3 51 are, in the abstract, "compelling" and "overriding, 3 52
the district court (following Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas) placed
347. Id. (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715).
348. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 242 (1963)(Brennan, J.,
concurring).
349. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
350. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1197-99.
351. Id. at 1200.
352. Id.
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the following additional burden of persuasion on the state: "[t]he
defendants must show that the state's interest in the education of
its children necessitates the uniform use of the Holt reading se-
ries-that this uniformity is essential to accomplishing the state's
goals. . . [to] achieve literacy and good citizenship for all students
.. .. The district court did not defer to school authorities the
way the Supreme Court deferred to the expertise of military offi-
cials in Goldman v. Weinberger.""
Although "uniformity would make the testing, grading, and
teaching of reading more manageable,"35 5 the trial record con-
tained credible testimony indicating that some expert educators,
including teachers in Hawkins County, believe that the teaching of
reading "is best accomplished through individualized instruc-
tion." '35 6 Moreover, plaintiffs' counsel had introduced "proof at
trial demonstrat[ing] that accommodating the plaintiffs is possible
without materially and substantially disrupting the educational
process. 3 57 If the goal of the school district is to unsettle the set-
tled convictions of all children who adhere to the absolute "truths"
taught by their parents, this is not a compelling state interest.
Judge Hull noted that the parents limited their objections to
books used in one class, and this diminished the potential for dis-
ruption. Moreover, the trial record disclosed that "[a]commodating
the beliefs of the small group of students involved in this case
probably would not wreak havoc in the school system by initiating
a barrage of requests for alternative materials." '358 Under these cir-
cumstances, the district court found that "a reasonable alternative
which could accommodate the plaintiffs' religious beliefs, effectu-
ate the state's interest in education, and avoid Establishment
Clause problems, would be to allow the plaintiff-students to opt
out of the school district's reading program. '3 59
353. Id. at 1201. In other words, the district court inquired "whether a less restrictive
means could accommodate both plaintiffs and defendants without running afoul of the Es-
tablishment Clause." Mozert, 765 F.2d at 78.
354. 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
355. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1201.
356. Id.
357 Id.; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1960) (students' freedom of speech was violated by ban on black armbands which were
worn in protest of Vietnam war, but which did not materially and substantially disrupt the
educational process).
358. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1202.
359. Id. at 1203.
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The district court's order requires the parents and school offi-
cials to confer if conferences are appropriate to facilitate any
needed improvement in reading.360 The child's reading proficiency
continues to be rated by the standardized achievement tests used
by the school authorities. Judge Hull noted that the plaintiff-chil-
dren "are bright and capable of completing . . . a program [of
home instruction under the tutelage of their parents] without seri-
ous detriment to their reading skills or citizenship. '361
The district court's order was narrowly tailored to the circum-
stances of the case; the opinion cannot "be interpreted to require
the school system to make this option available to any other per-
son or to these plaintiffs for any other subject. '3 6 2 Any further re-
quests for alternative texts, if not voluntarily acceded to by school
authorities, are not within the scope of the injunction. In sum, the
plaintiff-children are "entitled to opt out of the Hawkins County
public school reading program while still enjoying the benefit of
the rest of the curriculum (so long as they comply with the state's
existing requirements for home instruction).3 63 The order appears
both reasonable and appropriate, for "[w]hen rendering to God
and rendering to Caesar are in irreconcilable conflict, it does not
offend a proper notion of separation of church and state for Caesar
to recede when he can conveniently do so. '"364
The school authorities had urged the district court to adopt in
toto Chief Justice Burger's opinions"5 in Bowen v. Roy 366 but Judge
Hull noted that the relevant part of the Chief Justice's opinion was
joined by only two of his colleagues. The district court noted that
Justice O'Connor correctly pointed out that Burger's strict neutral-
ity approach-suddenly invoked in Roy-had no solid basis in
precedent.3 67
The appellate courts will notice that the district court applied
the methodology used in the Supreme Court's seminal cases, which
requires school authorities to show why the alternative reading
program suggested by the plaintiffs was not a practicable, less re-
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1204.
364. McConnell, supra note 2, at 26.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 275-85 for a description of the retired Chief Jus-
tice's opinion.
366. 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
367. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1200 n.11.
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strictive means of accommodating the plaintiffs' religious objec-
tions and the state's educational objectives. 368 The evidence was
not adduced, and the district court's judgment, in my view, is a
great victory for religious freedom. Whether the decision in favor
of the fundamentalists is a Pyrrhic victory depends on the appel-
late courts.
VIII. DEJA VU
As Yogi Berra said, "This is deja vu-all over again." Mozert v.
Hawkins County Public Schools,369 however, is not a rerun of the
Scopes trial; it is the echo of Minersville School District v. Gobi-
tis,370 which also involved students who were expelled from public
schools. They were expelled "for refusing to salute the national flag
as part of a daily school exercise. '371 "The children had been
brought up conscientiously to believe that such a gesture of respect
for the flag was forbidden by command of Scripture. '372
The Supreme Court in Gobitis held that injunctive relief was im-
proper. Justice Frankfurter wrote that "[c]onscientious scruples
have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration,
relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed
at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. 3 7 3 To hold oth-
erwise, Frankfurter added, "would . . . make us the school board
for the country. That authority has not been given to this Court,
nor should we assume it."'37 4 Chief Justice Stone, the lone dis-
senter, stated:
... I cannot say that the inconveniences which may attend some
sensible adjustment of school discipline in order that the religious
convictions of these children may be spared, presents a problem so
momentous or pressing as to outweigh the freedom from compulsory
violation of religious faith which has been thought worthy of consti-
tutional protection.37 5
Gobitis was overruled by West Virginia Board of Education v.
368. Id. at 1194.
369. 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
370. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
371. Id. at 591.
372. Id. at 591-92.
373. Id. at 594.
374. Id. at 598.
375. Id. at 607 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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Barnette.37 6
Although the fundamentalists in the Tennessee textbook contro-
versy do not have to declare their allegiance to any idea, idol or
symbol, the Barnette Court pointed out that it does not matter
whether pupils are required to "forego any contrary convictions of
their own and become unwilling converts to the prescribed cere-
mony. 37 7 What can be constitutionally objectionable is "officially
disciplined uniformity. ' 37 8 In Mozert, a nonjudgmental "values-
neutral" teaching approach is the officially disciplined protocol in
"reading" class.
Barnette illustrates that in some situations, the Supreme Court
acts, however reluctantly, as the "school board for the coun-
try . . . if we are not. . . to teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes. '3s0 Justice Jack-
son stated, "[w]e cannot, because of modest estimates of our com-
petence in such specialties as public education, withhold the judg-
ment that history authenticates as the function of this Court when
liberty is infringed." 81 The Court stated that "the sphere of intel-
lect and spirit" is reserved from "all official control." 382 Official
control is no less upsetting when a school's reading program dis-
credits a child's belief that there are right answers to questions of
morality and religion.
The Supreme Court imposes certain constitutional limits upon
the power of school authorities to control the curriculum and class-
room.3 83 It has held that, in the selection of library books, the
broad discretion of local school boards must be exercised "in a
manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives of the
First Amendment. 38 4 Local school boards, unless checked by judi-
cial review, have the power to become village tyrants, but liberty of
376. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
377. Id. at 633.
378. Id. at 637.
379. Id. (quoting Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 598).
380. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
381. Id. at 640.
382. Id. at 642.
383. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (declaring unconstitutional a state law that
prohibited the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution in any state-supported school);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a state law that forbade the teaching
of modern foreign languages in public and private schools).
384. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
864 (1982).
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conscience cannot be infringed in the name of "national unity,"3 85
or pluralism, or values clarification in the name of socialization.
The Hawkins County school authorities are really arguing that
they have virtually unfettered discretion to choose texts that
awaken in their students' minds ideas and considerations which
might be contrary to those implanted by religious parents. The
guarantee of religious freedom, however, carries with it a presump-
tion that permits a parent to respond to coercion by stating, "I
know what is best for my children's salvation." Bob Mozert's views
that the Bible is an inerrant and infallible source of truth are unor-
thodox, but recall Justice Jackson's warning that "one man's com-
fort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn. 3 86
The modern Supreme Court often quotes Justice Jackson's fa-
mous admonition: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion .... ,,387 There may be some exceptions to this elo-
quently stated principle,388 but the defendants in Mozert failed to
demonstrate that their unyielding attempt to impose a doctrine of
ethical relativism is a proper undertaking for school authorities.
385. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640-41.
386. Id. at 633.
387. Id. at 642.
388. Id.
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